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REMOTE ADJUDICATION IN IMMIGRATION 
Ingrid V. Eagly 
ABSTRACT—This Article reports the findings of the first empirical 
study of the use of televideo technology to remotely adjudicate the 
immigration cases of litigants held in detention centers in the United States. 
Comparing the outcomes of televideo and in-person cases in federal 
immigration courts, it reveals an outcome paradox: detained televideo 
litigants were more likely than detained in-person litigants to be deported, 
but judges did not deny respondents’ claims in televideo cases at higher 
rates. Instead, these inferior results were associated with the fact that 
detained litigants assigned to televideo courtrooms exhibited depressed 
engagement with the adversarial process—they were less likely to retain 
counsel, apply to remain lawfully in the United States, or seek an 
immigration benefit known as voluntary departure. 
Drawing on interviews of stakeholders and court observations from 
the highest-volume detained immigration courts in the country, this Article 
advances several explanations for why televideo litigants might be less 
likely than other detained litigants to take advantage of procedures that 
could help them. These reasons include litigants’ perception that televideo 
is unfair and illegitimate, technical challenges in litigating claims over a 
screen, remote litigants’ lower quality interactions with other courtroom 
actors, and the exclusion of a public audience from the remote courtroom. 
This Article’s findings begin an important conversation about technology’s 
threat to meaningful litigant participation in the adversarial process. 
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If you come into the courtroom and you see it’s a courtroom and you see the 
judge at a big desk wearing a black robe, then you realize it’s a court. If you 
take that same person and you put him in the video room . . . they see me 
basically as a big, disembodied head on the television. How is that any 
different than watching People’s Court or Judge Judy or something like that? 
They don’t really, really get it sometimes. We get it because we do it all the 
time—that’s our job. But I’m not sure with the particular respondents whether 
they realize sometimes what goes on.1  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, federal immigration courts have steadily 
expanded their reliance on videoconferencing technology. In 2012 alone, 
immigration judges conducted over 134,000 hearings in which the trial 
judge and the immigrant litigant met over a television screen, rather than 
face-to-face.2 This reliance on technology is reserved almost exclusively 
for immigrants held in detention. Today, nearly one-third of all detainees 
attend their immigration hearings by video, rather than in the traditional in-
person courtroom setting.3 If current trends continue, the majority of all 
detained immigrants will soon be assigned to televideo courtrooms to 
determine whether they will be deported from the United States.4 
 
1 Telephone Interview #48 with Representative, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges (Jan. 21, 2014) 
(on file with author). To protect confidentiality, all interviews cited in this Article are referenced by 
interview number, title, and organization type. 
2 See infra Figures 1 & 2. 
3 See infra Figure 4. 
4 For examples of televideo’s continued expansion in immigration court, see Julia Preston, 
Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2015, http:// 
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The Department of Justice characterizes remote adjudication as a 
“force multiplier”5 that assists overburdened immigration courts by 
expediting the processing of cases,6 enhancing judicial flexibility in case 
management,7 reducing transportation costs,8 improving law enforcement 
and courtroom safety,9 and expanding access to counsel.10 Despite such 
claimed benefits, critics of televised adjudication express deep skepticism. 
 
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-largest-immigration-detention-center-
in-us.html [http://perma.cc/DU5X-PX3Q] (announcing that immigration cases at the largest-yet 
detention center in Dilley, Texas will be held by videoconference); Kate Linthicum, ICE Opens 400-
Bed Immigration Detention Center near Bakersfield, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2015, http://www.latimes. 
com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ice-immigration-detention-mcfarland-20150323-story.html [http://perma.cc/ 
F9RT-NXQZ] (revealing that immigrants held at a new detention facility in Bakersfield, California 
“will have their court hearings via live video feeds”). 
5 FUNMI E. OLORUNNIPA, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., AGENCY USE OF VIDEO HEARINGS: 
BEST PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANSION 33 (Apr. 22, 2011), available at https:// 
www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Revised-Draft-Report-on-Agency-Use-of-Video-Hearings-
4-22-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3VS-FQAY] (quoting a representative of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR) as saying that “the use of VTC technology to hold hearings is a force 
multiplier”). 
6 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EOIR’S VIDEO 
TELECONFERENCING INITIATIVE 1 (2009) [hereinafter VIDEO INITIATIVE], available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/eoir/press/VTCFactSheet031309.pdf [http://perma.cc/5SKY-TYPS] (claiming that 
televideo expedites hearings); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHIEF 
IMMIGRATION JUDGE INITIATIVE: IMMIGRATION COURT VTC REVIEW 1 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter VTC 
REVIEW] (on file with author) (obtained by author with FOIA request #2013-15953) (“The use of VTC 
in the immigration court is believed to be an efficient way to adjudicate cases and to meet the Case 
Completion Goals for detained cases.”). 
7 John Stanton, The Technology the Government Uses for Immigration Hearings Doesn’t Work 
Right, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Aug. 11, 2014, 10:07 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/johnstanton/the-
technology-the-government-uses-for-immigration-hearings#.nh41JOK0Ds [http://perma.cc/DQU2-
FDZE] (quoting an EOIR official promoting televideo as a tool that “provides coverage to locations 
where [we do] not have a physical presence and, in areas where [we do] have a physical presence, 
creates greater flexibility in docket management by enabling non-local judges to assist with hearing 
cases”) (alteration in original). 
8 See, e.g., LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
ENHANCING QUALITY AND TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 94 (2012), 
available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timeliness-in-
Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf [http://perma.cc/DM3E-LD7P] (“Proponents 
say VTC hearings save EOIR the cost of transporting judges and staff to hearing sites and saves DHS 
costs of transporting detained respondents.”). 
9 See, e.g., id. at 92 (citing an EOIR official as explaining that televideo technology enhances 
courtroom safety); ASSESSMENT OF THE INS ENCRYPTED MULTIMEDIA VIDEO TELECONFERENCING 
PILOT at 22 [hereinafter INS ASSESSMENT] (on file with author) (noting that the “benefits to the 
Government” of teleconferencing deportation proceedings include “less exposure of law enforcement 
officers to risks associated with transportation of prisoners”). 
10 See, e.g., BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 8, at 93 (“VTC can increase the availability of 
representation during hearings by enabling an attorney who is unable or unwilling to travel to the site of 
a hearing to participate in the hearing from a remote location.”); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK 3 (2014) [hereinafter 
IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/ 
08/15/Televideo_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/S87K-WU5H] (claiming that remote adjudication can 
improve “the ability of counsel to represent detained aliens”). 
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Several influential immigration groups strenuously oppose the move away 
from face-to-face courtrooms, arguing that the practice prejudices those 
televideo respondents who pursue claims at trial.11 Federal appellate courts 
have warned that the practice might violate the statutory right to a fair 
hearing, or even constitutional due process, if it were to affect the ultimate 
decision at trial on the merits.12 The limited academic scholarship 
addressing remote immigration adjudication has joined in critiquing the 
practice, primarily because of its potential to interfere with judicial fact-
finding at trial.13 In defending against these concerns, court officials 
consistently return to one central refrain: televideo is functionally 
equivalent to in-person adjudication.14 That is, it does not affect decisional 
outcomes at trial.15 
Despite the divergence in views about televideo’s potential to 
influence deportation trials, missing from either side of the discussion is an 
exploration of the complementary relationship between remote adjudication 
and litigant participation in the adversarial process. This oversight is 
surprising because televideo technology infuses the entire court process, 
 
11 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas M. Susman, Dir., Gov’t Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass’n, to 
Members of the Committee on Adjudication, Admin. Conference of the U.S. (Feb. 17, 2012), available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2012feb23_immigrationadjudica 
tionreport_c.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/NEV3-YNLU] (“The ABA opposes using 
videoconferencing . . . except in procedural matters in which the noncitizen has given consent.”); Letter 
from the American Immigration Council & the American Immigration Lawyers Association, to Jean 
King, Acting Gen. Counsel, Exec. Office of Immigration Review 4 (Nov. 27, 2012), available at http:// 
legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/EOIR%20Reg%20Review%20Comments-FINAL%2011-27-12. 
pdf [http://perma.cc/M45G-PHJZ] (recommending evidentiary hearings on the merits be conducted in 
person). 
12 See, e.g., Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 532–34 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that the statutory 
right to a fair hearing is violated if video has “the potential for affecting the IJ’s view of [the 
respondent’s] credibility and in turn the outcome of [the] case”). 
13 See, e.g., Aaron Haas, Videoconferencing in Immigration Proceedings, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 59, 82 
(2006) (arguing that televideo violates due process); Emily B. Leung, Technology’s Encroachment on 
Justice: Videoconferencing in Immigration Court Proceedings, 14-07 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2014) 
(arguing that videoconferencing interferes with the immigration judge’s ability to assess the 
respondent’s credibility); Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1181–
82 (2009) (concluding that videoconferencing obstructs the court’s fact-finding process). 
14 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, QUESTIONS FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE VIDEO HEARING PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION 
ADJUDICATION AT EOIR 3 (2011) [hereinafter EOIR VIDEO HEARINGS] (on file with author) 
(“Generally, there is no difference [between video and in-person hearings] aside from the fact that in a 
video hearing at least one party is not physically at the hearing location.”); Letter from Michael F. 
Rahill, Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, to Geoffrey Heeren, Legal Assistance Found. of Metro. Chi. 
(Mar. 3, 2005) (on file with author) (describing televideo and in-person adjudication as “functionally 
equivalent”). 
15 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EOIR HEADQUARTERS 
IMMIGRATION COURT 1 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/HQICFactSheet.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3X2X-EE9S] (claiming that televideo hearings “do[] not change the adjudicative 
quality or decisional outcomes”). 
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not just the point when the case proceeds to trial and the judge is called 
upon to issue a formal ruling on a litigant’s petition. Yet, the existing 
debate does not consider the potential of televideo to shape the assertion of 
rights by the litigant subjected to the procedure. These important rights 
include the right to assert a claim to remain in the United States16 and the 
right to retain an attorney to assist in pursuing that claim.17 
This Article presents empirical findings from the first comprehensive 
study of the federal immigration system’s experiment with remote 
adjudication. One aspect of this research is quantitative analysis of a 
comprehensive electronic database of all federal immigration court 
proceedings collected by the Justice Department’s Executive Office for 
Immigration Review and obtained for research through the Freedom of 
Information Act.18 These highly informative data include coding at the 
individual hearing level for adjudicative medium (televideo or in person), 
yet until now have never been independently analyzed for purposes of 
understanding televideo adjudication. 
As discussed in Part II of this Article, these data uncover a paradoxical 
result: televideo cases were more likely to result in deportation,19 yet there 
was no statistically significant evidence that judges adjudicated deportation 
cases more harshly over a video screen. Instead, when compared with 
similar detained in-person cases,20 detained televideo cases exhibited 
depressed engagement with the adversarial process. Televideo litigants 
were less likely to retain counsel,21 pursue an application for permission to 
 
16 A noncitizen found subject to removal by an immigration judge may apply for one or more 
discretionary forms of “relief,” such as asylum or cancellation of removal. A noncitizen granted relief 
from removal may remain lawfully in the United States. For a discussion of different types of relief 
from removal, see infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
17 Although there is a right to be represented by counsel in immigration proceedings, the expense of 
counsel is borne by the respondent. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the 
privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing 
who is authorized to practice in such proceedings[.]”). See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s 
Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013) (discussing how lessons from the criminal system’s 
establishment of a public defender might inform the evolution of the right to counsel in the immigration 
system).  
18 These Freedom of Information Act requests were made by the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC), a data-gathering and research nonprofit organization at Syracuse University. I 
gained access to these data through my appointment as a TRAC Fellow. See Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse, TRAC Fellows Program (2011), http://trac.syr.edu/fellows/ [http://perma.cc/
H45N-2L6E].  
19 See infra Figure 10 (showing that detained televideo removal cases were more likely to result in 
deportation than detained in-person removal cases). 
20 In order to ensure that similarly situated cases were used for this comparison of televideo versus 
in-person adjudication, the data in this study were limited to only adult removal cases decided during 
2011 and 2012 in which the respondents remained detained during the entire case. See infra Part II. 
21 For readers interested in other issues regarding attorney representation in immigration court, see 
Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. 
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remain lawfully in the United States (known as relief),22 or seek the right to 
return voluntarily (known as voluntary departure).23 Moreover, these 
televideo versus in-person differences in litigant engagement remained 
statistically significant24 even when controlling for numerous factors that 
could influence case outcomes, including prosecutorial charge type, 
proceeding type, judge assignment, representation by counsel, nationality, 
and fiscal year of decision.25 When compared to similarly situated detained 
televideo respondents, detained in-person respondents were a remarkable 
90% more likely to apply for relief, 35% more likely to obtain counsel, and 
6% more likely to apply only for voluntary departure.26 
By contrast, review of the immigration court’s own case data does not 
support the conclusion that televideo courts assigned disadvantage in 
allocating relief to detained immigrants who appeared on a television 
screen. In other words, after controlling for numerous factors that could 
influence decisionmaking on the merits (including the judge assigned to the 
case, representation by counsel, prosecutorial charge type, nationality, and 
fiscal year of decision), there was no statistically significant difference in 
grant rates for relief and voluntary departure applications across televideo 
and in-person detained cases.27 Televideo must therefore be understood as 
having an indirect relationship to overall substantive case outcomes—one 
linked to the disengagement of litigants who are separated from the 
traditional courtroom setting. 
 
PA. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2015) (presenting the results of the first national study of access to counsel 
in removal proceedings). 
22 See supra note 16. 
23 A noncitizen in removal proceedings may apply for permission to leave the United States 
“voluntarily” instead of by order of the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(b) (2015). Voluntary 
departure is often considered to be a benefit, as it allows the immigrant to avoid certain harsh 
consequences of a judge-issued removal order, such as bars to lawful readmission. However, given that 
respondents granted voluntary departure must leave the country, this Article does not refer to voluntary 
departure as a form of relief. This approach follows that adopted by EOIR, which defines voluntary 
departure as “a form of removal, not a type of relief.” EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at Q1 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 YEARBOOK], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf [http://perma.cc/RWD4-EG8S]. 
24 Most of the findings in this Article are significant at the most stringent p < 0.001 level, which 
means that the probability of this result occurring by chance is less than one in one thousand. The 
generally accepted threshold for statistical significance is 0.05, which indicates that the observed 
differences are not consistent with being due to chance. ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, 
STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 154 (4th ed. 2009). 
25 To aid interested readers, additional detail regarding the coding and analysis of the immigration 
court data is provided in this Article’s Appendix. 
26 These percentages are based on the differences in predicted probabilities calculated from the 
logit regression on the Active Base City Sample of detained removal cases displayed in Figure 11, 
infra. 
27 See infra Part II. 
109-4 EAGLY MASTER COPY II (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2015 4:42 PM 
109:933 (2015) Remote Adjudication 
939 
Analysis of the immigration court data also demonstrates that reliance 
on televideo is reshaping immigration adjudication in profound ways that 
have thus far been underappreciated. Although government officials often 
describe televideo as “an important hearing tool” that promotes efficiency 
in all types of immigration cases,28 in practice it is used almost exclusively 
to adjudicate the cases of detained immigrants.29 In addition, these 
televideo cases, when compared to similar detained cases litigated in 
person, are resolved more quickly—in fewer days and with fewer trials.30 
Far from a neutral adjudicative tool, televideo should instead be understood 
as an intentional design element of a rapidly evolving detention-to-
deportation pipeline. 
To clarify these quantitative findings, I turn to research I conducted 
during a series of visits to immigration courts and detention centers.31 This 
qualitative investigation included site visits to six of the highest volume 
televideo jurisdictions in the country: Chicago, Elizabeth (New Jersey), 
Houston, Los Angeles, Newark, and San Antonio. During these visits I 
observed in-person and televideo hearings at thirteen different hearing 
locations.32 In addition to attending court sessions, I attended know-your-
rights sessions offered by nonprofit organizations to educate unrepresented 
detainees about the court process.33 My research also benefitted from the 
 
28 BRIAN M. O’LEARY, CASE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING POLICIES: HEARINGS CONDUCTED 
BY VIDEO-CONFERENCE IN THE IMMIGRATION COURTS 4 (2007) [hereinafter CASE MANAGEMENT AND 
OPERATING POLICIES] (on file with author) (detailing “The Advantages” of televideo, such as reduced 
“travel time and costs” and “increased pro bono representation,” and concluding by advising 
immigration judges: “Video is an important hearing tool. Learn to use it!”). 
29 See infra Figure 2. Although I frequently use the term “immigrant” or “noncitizen” to describe 
the subject of removal proceedings, this terminology is not meant to diminish the very real problem of 
the government’s placement of United States citizens in deportation proceedings. See generally Rachel 
E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 
1968–71 (2013) (exploring the complexity of having citizenship determined in the context of a 
deportation proceeding). 
30 See infra Figure 7 & notes 143–45. 
31 Mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches can produce a better understanding of many 
research problems. See JOHN W. CRESWELL & VICKI L. PLANO CLARK, DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING 
MIXED METHODS RESEARCH (2d ed. 2011). 
32 I observed in-person detained removal hearings in Chicago, Elizabeth (New Jersey), Houston, 
Los Angeles, and Pearsall (Texas). In addition, to improve my comparative understanding, I observed 
televideo detained hearings together with the detainees at the following locations: Texas State 
Penitentiary at Huntsville in Huntsville, Texas; Karnes County Civil Detention Center in Karnes City, 
Texas; Kenosha County Detention Center in Kenosha, Wisconsin; and Essex County Correctional 
Facility in Essex, New Jersey. In these settings, I observed the judge and other courtroom participants 
on the video screen. In addition, I observed televideo removal hearings (together with the judge, 
prosecutor, and immigrant counsel) in the following detained immigration courtrooms: Chicago, 
Elizabeth, Los Angeles, Newark, and San Antonio. 
33 I attended the nonprofit know-your-rights information sessions held at the following detention 
locations: Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey; Houston Contract Detention 
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opportunity to tour six different detention centers and jails that house 
immigrants awaiting their court hearings.34 
Finally, my inquiry into televideo practices draws on the expertise 
shared during forty-nine in-depth interviews with people familiar with the 
practice of immigration adjudication.35 To aid in identifying individuals 
suitable for participation in the study, I contacted persons in supervisory 
positions at nonprofit legal services organizations,36 attorneys appearing on 
the court’s list of free and low-cost immigration providers,37 partners at law 
firms with immigration expertise,38 leaders of major immigration 
organizations,39 representatives of the National Association of Immigration 
Judges,40 and prosecutors with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE).41 Interviews with detainees were not included due to restrictions 
placed by immigration officials on communicating with immigrants held in 
detention facilities.42 
 
Facility in Houston, Texas; South Texas Detention Facility in Pearsall, Texas; Kenosha County 
Detention Center in Kenosha, Wisconsin; and Essex County Correctional Facility in Essex, New Jersey. 
34 ICE and correctional officials hosted tours for me at the following detention facilities: Elizabeth 
Contract Detention Facility, Essex County Correctional Facility, Kenosha County Detention Center, 
Houston Contract Detention Facility, Karnes County Civil Detention Center, and South Texas 
Detention Facility. 
35 I conducted these semistructured interviews with the informed consent of participants pursuant to 
a protocol approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board. 
36 For example, I contacted court-based programs, law school immigration clinics, and immigrant 
legal services organizations. 
37 See Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Free Legal Services Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/states.htm [http://perma.cc/C2CP-CF6G]. 
38 In California and Texas, the process of identifying attorneys with immigration expertise was 
aided by state bar specializations in immigration law. 
39 For example, I contacted the local officers of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, 
attorneys practicing at the firms and organizations on the court’s list of free legal services providers, 
and attorneys designated as accepting detained cases on a list published by the National Immigration 
Project of the National Lawyers Guild. 
40 See FAQ’s, NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGR. JUDGES, http://naij-usa.org/faqs/ [http://perma.cc/7E7E-
XXEW] (“In 1979, the NAIJ was designated as the recognized representative for collective bargaining 
for all U.S. Immigration Judges.”). Although I invited EOIR officials in Washington, D.C. to participate 
in the study, EOIR declined my interview request. 
41 The agency ultimately declined to have local ICE attorneys participate in the study. However, the 
Director of Field Operations for ICE participated in an interview on behalf of the prosecutorial branch 
of ICE. 
42 Citing security and other concerns, ICE has regularly denied researchers permission to interview 
detainees. See, e.g., LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUND. OF METRO. CHI. & CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR 
JUSTICE, VIDEOCONFERENCING IN REMOVAL HEARINGS: A CASE STUDY OF THE CHICAGO 
IMMIGRATION COURT 6 (2005) [hereinafter CHICAGO STUDY], available at http:// chicagoappleseed.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/08/videoconfreport_080205.pdf [http://perma.cc/V5RW-YEYZ] (noting that 
ICE “refused to allow us to interview immigrants” held in detention centers regarding their court 
experience); Nina Rabin, Unseen Prisoners: Women in Immigration Detention Facilities in Arizona, 
23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 695, 710 (2009) (explaining that researchers “repeatedly requested permission 
from ICE to interview detainees” held in a county jail, but these requests were denied). 
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This on-the-ground assessment of the inner workings of detained 
adjudication suggests that a number of factors are at play in the depressed 
engagement of televideo litigants. As developed in Part III, televideo 
litigants may decline to participate in a system they perceive as unjust or 
rigged to yield unfavorable results. Immigrants forced to pursue a case over 
a video screen often appear bewildered or confused and may experience the 
process as less “real.” Placement away from the physical courtroom 
separates the immigrant from other courtroom actors, including the judge, 
prosecutor, and respondent’s counsel. Detainees and their attorneys are 
frequently discouraged by the numerous logistical and technical difficulties 
associated with litigating televideo cases, such as unpredictable 
interruptions in the video feed, challenges in communicating with 
interpreters not physically present in the same room, and the impossibility 
of confidential attorney–client communication over a public courtroom 
screen. Detainees removed from the courtroom by the video procedure may 
be less likely to understand their rights in the removal process, less likely to 
request a court continuance to find a lawyer, and, especially for those who 
cannot find or afford an attorney, less equipped to assert their claims and 
file the required paperwork. For judges, advising litigants of their rights can 
be awkward and less effective over a screen than face-to-face in the formal 
setting of a courtroom. Yet another factor that could promote televideo 
litigants’ waiver of rights is their physical separation from the courtroom 
audience, including family and supportive community members, due to 
detention facility rules that prevent the public from attending hearings at 
remote locations. 
Opposition to remote adjudication has relied on the conventional 
wisdom that the practice unfairly tilts the balance against litigants at trial. 
This Article fails to confirm that standard hypothesis, but instead 
introduces an entirely new and serious concern into the debate: the 
potential of remote adjudication to interfere with meaningful participation 
in the adversarial process.43 This lack of participation matters because, with 
less attorney involvement and claimmaking by immigrants, televideo cases 
are more likely to result in deportation. Moreover, although this Article 
remains focused on the televideo debate in the immigration system, its 
finding of interference with access to justice is relevant in other contexts, 
such as administrative and criminal proceedings, which are increasingly 
 
43 As such, this Article responds to the call of socio-legal scholars to pay more attention to what 
happens in “the early stages of disputes and to the factors that determine whether” litigants assert and 
vigorously pursue potential claims. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of 
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636 (1981). 
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turning to remote technology in hopes of enhancing courtroom efficiency.44 
So long as participation in the process suffers, remote adjudication cannot 
be defended as the modern functional equivalent of the traditional 
courtroom. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces televideo’s expansion 
in detained immigration courts and introduces readers to the basics of 
immigration court procedures. Part II sets forth the key quantitative 
findings based on analysis of the immigration court’s own administrative 
database of immigration court cases. Finally, Part III relies on my in-depth 
qualitative investigation of detained immigration adjudication to offer some 
potential explanations for the asymmetrical patterns observed in the data 
among litigants in pursuing relief, but not among courts in allocating relief. 
I. IMMIGRATION’S REMOTE ADJUDICATION EXPERIMENT 
Federal immigration courts collectively handle over 300,000 trial-
level immigration cases a year and employ over 250 immigration judges.45 
Today’s immigration bench sits in sixty different geographic jurisdictions,46 
referred to in practice as “base cities.” Many base cities have several 
different hearing locations, including hearing locations located inside 
prisons, jails, and detention centers.47 Immigration judges are appointed by 
the Attorney General and serve as employees of the Department of 
Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), rather than as 
part of the federal judiciary.48 
 
44 For example, the Administrative Conference of the United States has enthusiastically 
recommended that federal government agencies with high-volume caseloads adopt videoconferencing 
for improved efficiency in adjudication. COMM. ON ADJUDICATION, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
AGENCY USE OF VIDEO HEARINGS: BEST PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANSION 3–4 (2011), 
available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Proposed-Recommendation-Video-
Hearings-5-18-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ6T-AXV6]. The criminal justice system also routinely 
relies on televideo, including for preliminary hearings, arraignments, and bail hearings. Anne Bowen 
Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 
1089, 1142–56 (2004). 
45 See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at B7 fig.2 (reporting that immigration courts received 
317,930 proceedings in fiscal year 2012); EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last 
updated Feb. 2015), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm [http://perma.cc/T5A3-6C3L] 
(listing immigration judges by court jurisdiction). 
46 See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, supra note 45. 
47 For example, the base city of San Antonio, Texas includes hearing locations at the Karnes 
County Civil Detention Center, the Pearsall Detention Facility, the Hutto Residential Facility, and the 
Laredo Detention Facility. See Exec. Office for Immigration Review, List of EOIR Immigration Courts, 
Document #5 (obtained by author with FOIA request #2013-20913 on Dec. 2, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
48 8 C.F.R § 1003.0 (2015) (describing the organization of EOIR within the Department of Justice). 
For a proposal that the immigration courts be restructured as Article I courts, see Dana Leigh Marks, An 
Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S 
IMMIGR. BULL. 3 (2008). 
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Immigration judges are charged with the power to order immigrants 
deported.49 Some individuals charged in immigration courts may in fact be 
United States citizens.50 Others are lawful permanent residents, but subject 
to removal based on alleged immigration law violations.51 Still others are 
present without lawful immigrant status but are nonetheless eligible to 
remain lawfully in the United States.52 
For readers unfamiliar with immigration law, it is important to 
acknowledge that many of the immigrants held in detention centers are not 
awaiting court hearings.53 Instead, an increasingly large number of 
detainees are removed from the United States without a court order. For 
example, especially when immigrants are apprehended along the border, 
law enforcement officials may allow them to depart on their own without 
filing any charges in court.54 Immigrants convicted of certain crimes who 
are not lawful permanent residents are subject to “administrative removal” 
without a hearing in immigration court.55 Immigrants previously ordered 
deported by an immigration judge routinely have their prior orders 
administratively “reinstated from its original date” without judicial 
review.56 Similarly, pursuant to a process known as “expedited removal,” 
recent border entrants may be summarily turned back without ever stepping 
foot in a courtroom (or appearing in a court via video).57 Seen in this 
 
49 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012). 
50 These citizenship cases include individuals born in the United States as well as those who 
derived citizenship through a parent. See Rosenbloom, supra note 29, at 1972 (explaining how 
citizenship claims occur in deportation cases and citing statistics on the number of United States 
citizens detained or deported). 
51 For example, a lawful permanent resident convicted of an “aggravated felony” is deportable. 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
52 For example, certain undocumented battered immigrants may be eligible to gain status as lawful 
permanent residents based on their familial relationship to the batterer. Id. § 1229b(b)(2). As I have 
previously argued, immigration status may best be understood as existing along a spectrum, rather than 
sharply divided between unlawful and lawful status. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: 
An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1136–37 (2013). 
53 According to Department of Homeland Security statistics, only 230,000 of the 419,384 
noncitizens removed from the United States in 2012 saw an immigration judge. JOHN F. SIMANSKI & 
LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, at 1–
2, 5 (2013), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2012 
_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9JN-MFPM]. 
54 8 C.F.R. § 240.25 (2015) (granting officers the authority “to permit aliens to depart voluntarily 
from the United States . . . in lieu of being subject to proceedings”). 
55 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1) (2012) (allowing the removal of aliens “convicted of committing 
aggravated felonies”). 
56 Id. § 1231(a)(5). 
57 Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). For example, expedited removal applies to individuals apprehended 
within 100 miles of the border that have not been in the country for more than two weeks. Designating 
Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,880 (Aug. 11, 2004). 
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broader context, deportation by order of a federal immigration judge is but 
one component of current immigration enforcement efforts.58 
The remainder of this Part describes the history and development of 
the televideo mode of adjudication in immigration courts. Remote 
adjudication began as a small-scale experiment in Chicago and soon 
expanded to court locations across the United States. Yet, as the empirical 
analysis presented in this Part establishes, the transition to remote 
adjudication has been reserved almost exclusively for the cases of detained 
immigrants. 
A. Televideo’s Rise in Detention 
Traditionally, most immigration court proceedings were held in 
downtown urban courts, with all participants attending in person. In cases 
involving pretrial detention, detainees were transported from the detention 
facility to attend court hearings in the physical presence of the judge. Some 
detention facilities were in close proximity to the immigration court, 
whereas others required traveling an hour or more on an early morning bus. 
As detained populations grew, some immigration courts opted to instead 
hold court inside detention centers.59 Judges and court staff would travel 
“on detail” and set up courtrooms inside the jails and prisons that housed 
immigrants awaiting their hearings.60 
Televideo represents a new adjudicative approach that instead 
connects the detained immigrant with the judge, prosecutor, and other court 
personnel via a bidirectional video stream.61 Courts equipped with televideo 
 
58 As Jennifer Chacón has noted, “[r]emovals are merely the tip of the iceberg with regard to 
enforcement actions.” Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the 
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1565 (2010). See also Jill E. 
Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 611–32 
(2009) (summarizing the methods, aside from removal hearings, that the government uses to remove 
noncitizens); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 
5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 2 (2015) (documenting a rise in “speed removals” in which immigrants never 
see “a courtroom or an immigration judge,” and are instead subjected to “a limited set of procedural 
protections leading to speedy removals”). 
59 Institutional Hearing Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41 (1997) [hereinafter IHP Hearings] (prepared statement of 
Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge). 
60 Interview #14 with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Aug. 7, 2013) (on file with author) 
(explaining that prior to the introduction of videoconferencing, judges “used to circuit-ride” to conduct 
“live, in-person hearings for people” at prisons and detention centers); Interview #47 with 
Representative, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges (Nov. 21, 2014) (on file with author) (“We were 
doing it a lot. Each of us had prisons . . . we call it ‘detail.’”). 
61 For a discussion of the use of videoconferencing in other courtroom settings, including for 
criminal trials and remote witness testimony, see Nancy Gertner, Videoconferencing: Learning Through 
Screens, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 769 (2004); Fredric I. Lederer, The Road to the Virtual 
Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s—and Tomorrow’s—High-Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. 
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technology follow the same basic procedures as in-person courts, the key 
exception being that the immigrant now remains at the detention facility 
and watches the court proceedings on a television screen in the facility’s 
video room. The judge remains in the traditional courtroom with his or her 
courtroom deputy and court staff, and the immigrant is projected onto a 
television screen in the courtroom.62 Typically, the prosecutor, interpreter, 
and any respondent’s counsel remain in the courtroom with the judge rather 
than traveling to the detention facility to appear on video with the 
immigrant.63 
Televideo was introduced to immigration courts in the 1990s. The 
initial experiment with video technology linked immigration judges in 
Chicago, Illinois, with immigrants held at a Federal Bureau of Prisons 
facility in Lexington, Kentucky.64 Despite some technical problems,65 court 
officials concluded that the Chicago initiative was a success. The pilot 
program was credited with reducing travel costs, decreasing “exposure of 
law enforcement officers to risks associated with transportation of 
prisoners,” and improving judges’ hearing schedules.66 
In 1996, Congress authorized the use of televideo in all immigration 
proceedings.67 Under the new law, televideo and in-person hearings became 
interchangeable modes of adjudication.68 The immigration court could now 
conduct all hearings by televideo without ever obtaining consent of the 
immigrant respondent. 
 
REV. 799 (1999); Michael D. Roth, Note, Laissez-Faire Videoconferencing: Remote Witness Testimony 
and Adversarial Truth, 48 UCLA L. REV. 185 (2000). 
62 I was not permitted to photograph the interior of immigration courts. However, for a photograph 
of the standard video screen used in televideo courtrooms, see EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW, DIGITAL AUDIO RECORDING USER MANUAL 12 fig.3-1 (2012) (obtained by author with FOIA 
request #2014-7182) (on file with author). 
63 I did observe a few exceptions to this standard arrangement. For example, in Los Angeles the 
interpreter remained at the remote location (Adelanto, California). In Houston, the prosecutor remained 
at the remote location (Huntsville, Texas). In one hearing in San Antonio, a respondent’s counsel 
appeared with her client at the remote location (Taylor, Texas). 
64 Memorandum from Lynn E. Petersburg, Deputy Exec. Officer, Office of Mgmt. & Admin, Exec. 
Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Jim Moore, Telecomm. Specialist, 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. 1 (Jan. 5, 1994) (on file with author). 
65 Id. at 2 (outlining a number of “system modifications” that need to be implemented, including 
the need for “telephoto lenses” so that “facial expressions can be discerned”); Letter from Alan Shelton, 
Assistant Comm’r, Sys. Integration Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Joan Higgins, Assistant Comm’r, 
Detention & Deportation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 20, 1994) (on file with author) (noting that “the 
video equipment utilized [in the pilot] was not of the highest quality nor was its configuration well 
suited for the hearings”). 
66 INS ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 22. 
67 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-589 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012)).  
68 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(c) (2015) (“An Immigration Judge may conduct hearings through video 
conference to the same extent as he or she may conduct hearings in person.”). 
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It is unclear how often immigration courts employed televideo in the 
period immediately following congressional authorization of its use. In 
these early years of televideo’s implementation, as seen in Figure 1, most 
immigration hearings were not coded for adjudicative medium.69 From 
2007 to 2012, however, the data consistently recorded whether immigration 
hearings were conducted in person, by televideo, or, much less frequently, 
by telephone.70 For these six more recent years, televideo can be reliably 
analyzed because the adjudicative medium variable is known in 97% of 
hearing records. 
FIGURE 1: CODING OF IMMIGRATION HEARINGS, BY ADJUDICATIVE MEDIUM,  




69 An earlier effort to quantitatively study televideo in asylum cases suffers from the fatal flaw of 
relying on televideo data during the pre-2007 time period when the adjudicatory medium variable was 
not reliably populated. See Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly-
Line Justice? The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 
271–72 (2008). 
70 My analysis of the data reveals that during the time period from 2007 to 2012, only 1% of 
adjourned immigration hearings were by telephone. As I observed in my site visits, telephone 
adjudication is generally discouraged by immigration judges and, unlike televideo, requires the 
respondent’s signed consent for use at individual evidentiary hearings on the merits. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.25(c). 
71 Figure 1 and other figures in this Article reporting hearings by fiscal year rely on the scheduled 
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Figure 1 also captures the steady increase in televideo’s use. During 
this six-year period from 2007 to 2012, the absolute number of televideo 
hearings increased nearly three-fold. As Figure 2 depicts, however, 
virtually all of this growth in televideo hearings involved individuals who 
began their cases in detention. Despite having the authority to adjudicate all 
immigration cases by televideo, immigration courts have reserved the 
televideo tool almost exclusively to adjudicate detained cases. 
FIGURE 2: TELEVIDEO IMMIGRATION HEARINGS, BY DETENTION STATUS,  
FISCAL YEARS 2007–201272 
 
This finding of heavy televideo use in detention was confirmed by my 
site visits. One of the rare examples of televideo being used for cases not 
involving detention occurred in Newark, New Jersey, where an 
immigration judge transitioning to a different jurisdiction continued to hear 
his pending nondetained Newark cases by televideo during the transition 
period. Another example occurred in Chicago, where a judge sitting in 
Arlington provided occasional backup by televideo on nondetained cases to 
alleviate strain on the overburdened Chicago judges. 
The rise of televideo parallels a corresponding increase in the practice 
of detaining immigrants while their cases are adjudicated.73 Indeed, 
 
72 Figure 2 contains all hearings, regardless of proceeding type, held in immigration courts, by 
fiscal year of adjournment of the hearing. 
73 For an introduction to the role of detention in immigration enforcement, see Anil Kalhan, 
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Congress’s 1996 authorization of televideo hearings without respondent 
consent coincided with a major expansion of the detention laws,74 including 
mandatory detention for immigrants subject to removal on certain criminal 
grounds.75 My analysis of immigration court data shows that the number of 
detained removal proceedings increased by one-third between 2002 and 
2012.76 
To sustain this trend of detaining immigrants as they litigate their 
court cases, today there are an impressive 34,000 beds maintained 
exclusively for immigration detainees.77 Despite the fact that the majority 
of detainees do not have criminal records,78 this bed space includes rented 
halls of local jails, as well as state and federal prisons.79 As Figures 1 and 2 
reveal, much of the court capacity for handling these detained cases now 
relies on televideo adjudication. Moreover, signaling that this trend may 
continue, the federal government’s newest detention facilities were 
intentionally designed to rely on televideo adjudication.80  
Having documented televideo’s close nexus to the growing practice of 
detaining immigrant litigants, the next Section introduces readers to the 
basics of immigration removal, focusing on the role of televideo at 
different stages in the process. 
 
74 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 1346, 1361–62 (2014) (reviewing the various laws passed in the 1980s and 1990s that expanded 
federal detention authority). 
75 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012); see generally Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 610–11 (2010) (describing the steady 
expansion in criminal grounds for mandatory detention).  
76 My analysis of the EOIR data reveals that immigration courts completed 101,827 detained 
removal proceedings in 2012, up from only 76,142 in 2002. See Appendix (describing EOIR data 
analyzed for this Article). 
77 See generally Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-
detention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html [http://perma.cc/
N6SF-YKQT] (discussing a “bed mandate” that requires ICE to keep an average of 34,000 detainees in 
custody). As Deputy Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas told the press in the summer of 
2014, “[w]e are surging resources to increase our capacity to detain individuals and adults with 
children, and to handle immigration court hearings.” Molly Hennessy-Fiske et al., Obama 
Administration Acts to Ease Immigration Legal Crunch at Border, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2014, http://
www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-border-migrants-white-house-20140620-story.html#page
=1 [http://perma.cc/5Y4V-BX9T]. 
78 Michelle Roberts, Most Immigrants in Detention Did Not Have Criminal Record, Reports AP, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/15/most-immigrants-in-
detent_n_175118.html [http://perma.cc/GSQ5-LZKL] (reporting that data obtained with a public 
records request show that of 32,000 immigrants held in detention on January 25, 2009, “18,690 
immigrants had no criminal conviction, not even for illegal entry or low-level crimes like trespassing”). 
79 For additional discussion of the growth in detention to house immigrants during deportation 
proceedings, see Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to 
Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (2013); Rabin, supra note 42. 
80 See generally supra note 4.  
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B. Televideo Trials 
Detained removal cases begin when immigration authorities 
apprehend noncitizens and formally charge them with removal in a “Notice 
to Appear.”81 Sometimes the initial arrest is by local police, who screen for 
immigration status and transfer the noncitizen to federal immigration 
authorities.82 Court cases for immigrants who remain detained during the 
entire process take anywhere from a few days to a few years, depending on 
the complexity of the case, court backlogs, and other factors.83 
The first court hearing in the removal process is known as the master 
calendar hearing.84 During the master calendar hearing, the immigrant 
responding to the government’s charge—referred to as the respondent—is 
advised of contents of the Notice to Appear. Unrepresented respondents are 
informed of their right to obtain counsel at their own expense and given a 
list of free legal services providers.85 Immigration judges also have an 
obligation to advise respondents of their right to seek relief from removal.86 
As I observed in my site visits and confirmed in my interviews, a 
group of detained immigrants will often appear together in a mass initial 
hearing, rather than individually.87 In these mass hearings, basic rights are 
explained to the entire group, normally followed by an individualized 
 
81 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (2015).  
82 See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 
1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749 (2011) (discussing ways in which local police enforcement of criminal 
law can lead to deportation). As Hiroshi Motomura has argued, the decision to arrest is “the stage of 
discretion that matters” the most in determining who actually is removed from the United States. 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local 
Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1829 (2011). 
83 The average number of days to adjudicate a detained removal merits proceeding in fiscal years 
2007 to 2012 was twenty-six days (standard deviation of eighty-four days), with a median time to 
completion of one day. However, as discussed in Part II.A, average adjudication times for detained 
removal proceedings with claims for relief were much longer. See infra Figure 7 & notes 143–45. For 
additional analysis of case adjudication times in removal cases, see Eagly & Shafer, supra note 21. 
84 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMMIGRATION COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.15(a), at 67 (2009) [hereinafter COURT PRACTICE MANUAL], available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_review.pdf [http://perma.cc/EU8T-2YGT] 
(“A respondent’s first appearance before an Immigration Judge in removal proceedings is at a master 
calendar hearing.”).  
85 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)–(3). 
86 Id. § 1240.11(a)(2) (“The immigration judge shall inform the alien of his or her apparent 
eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enumerated in this chapter and shall afford the alien an 
opportunity to make application during the hearing . . . .”).  
87 See, e.g., Telephone Interview #27 with Senior Staff Attorney, Nonprofit Org. (Sept. 11, 2013) 
(on file with author) (“Some judges go ahead and advise everybody of their basic rights and tell them 
they’re under oath all at once in a group; some of them do it individually.”). As Robert Koulish 
described in his pioneering study of asylum adjudication, “[t]he mass calendar hearing operates in an 
assembly line fashion.” Robert E. Koulish, Systemic Deterrence Against Prospective Asylum Seekers: A 
Study of the South Texas Immigration District, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 529, 553 (1992).  
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inquiry into whether the respondents understand their rights.88 Sometimes 
respondents at the master calendar hearing will ask the judge for a 
continuance in order to have more time to seek counsel, or to prepare an 
application for relief.89 
Immigration cases that raise complex and contested issues of law or 
fact will continue to trial, known in practice as an individual calendar 
hearing.90 Most frequently, these individual hearings are used when a 
respondent files an application for relief to remain lawfully in the United 
States—such as asylum,91 adjustment of status,92 or cancellation of 
removal.93 To qualify for relief, a respondent must satisfy the applicable 
statutory eligibility requirements and convince the judge that the case 
merits the exercise of favorable discretion.94 
Alternatively (or in addition), some respondents request that the judge 
grant a discretionary benefit known as voluntary departure. Voluntary 
departure requires the respondent to satisfy certain statutory eligibility 
requirements and pay the cost of removal.95 In exchange, the voluntary 
departure recipient must leave the country, but will not be subject to certain 
 
88 See generally United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1985) (expressing 
disapproval of a mass immigration hearing in which thirty-three immigrants were deported, but refusing 
to find a per se due process violation). 
89 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (“The Immigration Judge may grant a motion for continuance for good cause 
shown.”). See generally Eagly & Shafer, supra note 21, at 33–36, 61–63 (analyzing patterns in judicial 
grants of continuances to find counsel in immigration removal cases).  
90 COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 84, § 4.16(a), at 79 (“Evidentiary hearings on contested 
matters are referred to as individual calendar hearings or merits hearings. Contested matters include 
challenges to removability and applications for relief.”). As research by Jennifer Koh has shown, at 
times the threshold question of removability itself can be complex and require an individual calendar 
hearing. Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1805–06, 1821–51 (2013). 
91 Asylum is a form of discretionary relief available to individuals who qualify as “refugees” by 
demonstrating past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on the noncitizen’s race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, and/or membership in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). Applicants for asylum may also be considered for relief under withholding of 
removal and the Convention Against Torture by satisfying a more stringent standard. See generally 
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 903–
08 (7th ed. 2012). 
92 Adjustment of status is a form of relief from removal available to noncitizens eligible for lawful 
permanent resident status based on a visa petition approved by the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
93 Cancellation of removal is a form of relief available to both lawful permanent residents and 
undocumented individuals who have lived for a minimum number of years in the United States and who 
satisfy certain requirements. Id. § 1229b. For a discussion of other common types of relief from 
removal, see EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FORMS OF RELIEF FROM REMOVAL (2004), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.htm [http://perma.cc/TG2M-
PZ7V]. 
94 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4). In exercising discretion, immigration judges must “weigh the credible 
testimony along with other evidence of record.” Id. § 1229a(c)(4)(B). 
95 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)–(c) (2015) (setting forth the standards that govern discretionary grants of 
voluntary departure during or at the end of removal proceedings).  
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statutory bars against reentry to the United States that normally attach to 
removal orders.96 
Finally, at any point in the proceeding, eligible detainees may request 
a separate custody hearing to determine eligibility and terms for release on 
bond.97 If release is granted and the immigrant is able to afford the required 
bond amount,98 the case will no longer be part of the immigration court’s 
detained docket. Instead, the respondent will be ordered to appear in person 
before a judge assigned to that jurisdiction’s nondetained court.99 
In keeping with the dominant trial-focused critique of televideo, 
immigration court officials initially maintained that televideo should be 
limited to the reading of charges and other pretrial procedural hearings, but 
not relied on for individual hearings where judges decide the merits of 
cases.100 Over time, however, officials retreated from this position, 
eventually allowing televideo’s use in all hearings, including individual 
hearings.101 As explained by one immigration prosecutor during my site 
visit, judges used to allow respondents appearing by televideo to at least 
attend their merits hearing in person, but “now video is the default” for all 
hearings. A seasoned practitioner similarly lamented that initially officials 
would “bring the client to the immigration court” for trial.102 But, later, as 
 
96 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A). 
97 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a), (d). Certain categories of immigrants are not eligible for release on bond. 
Id. § 1236.1(c). For example, noncitizens convicted of certain types of crimes may be mandatorily 
detained during the removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). For a convincing argument that counsel 
should be appointed to determine whether detainees may be mandatorily detained, see Mark Noferi, 
Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained 
Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012). 
98 Although many detainees are ineligible for release, others remain detained despite a release order 
because they cannot afford the bond amount set by the court. The statutory minimum bond amount is 
$1500, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A), although judges may also release respondents on their own 
recognizance, id. § 1226(a)(2)(B). In the custody hearings that I observed around the country, bond 
amounts set by judges ranged from a low of $1500 to a high of $50,000. I routinely observed judges 
ordering release with a bond amount that the immigrant stated at the hearing he or she would be unable 
to afford. 
99 During my site visits, I observed respondents released from custody by the judge and ordered to 
report to their next court hearing in person at a nondetained court location. Several interviewees also 
confirmed this practice. See, e.g., Telephone Interview #23 with Supervising Detention Attorney, 
Nonprofit Org. (Sept. 5, 2013) (on file with author) (noting that respondents released from custody 
“would be moved to the docket of one of the nondetained judges”). 
100 See IHP Hearings, supra note 59, at 41 (prepared statement of Michael J. Creppy, Chief 
Immigration Judge, explaining that televideo was initially reserved for master calendar hearings).  
101 EOIR VIDEO HEARINGS, supra note 14, at 3 (“All types of proceedings may be heard by 
[televideo]. EOIR conducts removal proceedings including master calendar (pleadings, issue 
identification and scheduling), and individual hearing through VTC.”). 
102 Telephone Interview #20 with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Aug. 21, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
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televideo was more fully implemented, “they stopped bringing the 
client.”103 
FIGURE 3: TELEVIDEO HEARINGS IN DETAINED REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS,  
BY HEARING TYPE, FISCAL YEARS 2007–2012104 
 
Figure 3 traces this rise in televideo’s use across all types of detained 
removal hearings.105 The televideo tool is now relied on for master calendar 
hearings, custody hearings, and individual hearings. Although individual 
hearings remained the least common type of televideo hearing, this finding 
simply reflects the infrequency of trials in detained removal cases. During 
the six-year period from 2007 to 2012, only 7% of detained removal cases 
 
103 Id. Other attorneys made similar comments. See, e.g., Telephone Interview #23, supra note 99 
(explaining that initially only master calendar hearings were by video, but “when they got the 
technology to have two courtrooms equipped with the video equipment then everyone started, for both 
masters and merits, appearing by video”). 
104 Figure 3 contains all adjourned hearings in detained removal proceedings. “Master” includes 
hearings coded as Detained Master, Master Asylum, and Initial Master. “Individual” includes 
Individual, Individual Detained, and Individual Asylum. “Other” includes less common hearing types, 
such as attorney discipline hearings. 
105 Although removal is by far the most common type of immigration proceeding, other proceeding 
types include credible fear, reasonable fear, claimed status, asylum only, rescission, continued detention 
review, Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), and withholding only. 
2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at C1–C3 & C3 tbl.3 (classifying 310,455 out of the 317,930 
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contained one or more individual hearings, compared to 42% of removal 
cases for respondents who were never detained.106 
Another important pattern that emerges from the data is that for most 
removal proceedings the same adjudicative medium (televideo or in 
person) was used for all hearings. In other words, once an individual 
immigrant’s removal process began in one mode, all subsequent hearings 
followed in the same mode. 
Figure 4 depicts the different approaches to adjudicative medium 
using the detained removal proceeding as the unit of analysis.107 In the most 
common adjudicative model, which I call pure in-person adjudication, all 
hearings within a proceeding are held in person. In the second most 
common adjudicative model, which I call pure televideo adjudication, all 
hearings within a proceeding are held by televideo. In the third adjudicative 
model, which I call hybrid adjudication, in-person and video hearings are 
both used within a single proceeding. 
As Figure 4 reveals in more detail, reliance on pure in-person 
adjudication in detained removal merits proceedings declined sharply 
during the six-year period from 2007 to 2012. In its place, pure televideo 
adjudication increased.108 By 2012, almost one-third of detained 
proceedings were conducted using pure televideo adjudication: 25,955 
detained proceedings used pure televideo adjudication, compared to 63,877 
that used pure in-person adjudication. In contrast, for individuals never 
subject to detention, 97.7% of removal proceedings in 2012 received pure 
in-person adjudication.109 That is, individuals not subject to detention 
almost always proceeded in person with the judge. 
 
 
106 These differences were statistically significant (p < 0.001, equality of proportions test). The 
smaller number of trials in detained cases corresponds with the fact that detained cases also included 
fewer claims for relief. Nationally, only 7% of detained removal cases included at least one affirmative 
claim for relief (other than voluntary departure), compared to 49% of never-detained removal cases (p < 
0.001, equality of proportions test). 
107 To clarify, a “proceeding” often contains several different hearings. For example, a proceeding 
could begin with a master calendar hearing, later include a custody hearing, and end with an individual 
hearing. 
108 Although the total number of detained removal proceedings increased during the decade from 
2002 to 2012, see supra note 76 & Figure 4, infra, reflects that the total number of detained proceedings 
declined somewhat during the 2007 to 2012 time period. 
109 The remaining never-detained removal proceedings decided in 2012 were adjudicated in the 
pure televideo mode (0.8%) and in the hybrid mode (1.5%). 
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FIGURE 4: DETAINED REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, BY ADJUDICATIVE MODE, 
FISCAL YEARS 2007–2012110 
 
Figure 4 also demonstrates that hybrid proceedings—which included 
at least one televideo and one in-person hearing—were relatively 
infrequent among detained cases. When detained hybrid proceedings did 
occur, they fell into one of several different scenarios. One scenario 
occurred when televideo equipment was not available, either due to 
equipment failure or insufficient availability of televideo courtrooms.111 
Another scenario occurred as courts transitioned their dockets from in-
person adjudication to televideo,112 naturally resulting in hybrid 
 
110 Figure 4 charts the adjudicative mode for all proceedings in all detained removal cases where 
hearing-level data were available (92.3% of proceedings during 2007 to 2012). For purposes of 
categorizing the adjudicative mode of hearings within a single proceeding, telephone hearings (which 
were only 1% of all hearings) were not counted. Nor were certain hearings where EOIR’s adjournment 
coding clearly indicated that the hearing was not held (i.e., unplanned immigration judge leave or detail 
assignment, resetting of the hearing, and data entry errors) or where medium data were missing. See 
Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for Immigration 
Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2–8 (June 16, 2005) [hereinafter Adjournment Code Memo] (obtained by 
author with FOIA request #2014-7182) (on file with author) (defining the adjournment codes for 
hearings used in the court’s record keeping system). 
111 As the Court Administrator in San Antonio explained, “although there are four VTC courtrooms 
at Pearsall [detention facility], there are instances where six judges are waiting to hear cases at Pearsall 
which are set at the same time. Therefore, in an attempt to complete the hearing, the respondent may be 
brought to the San Antonio Immigration Court for an in-person hearing.” VTC REVIEW, supra note 6, at 
7. 
112 As Figures 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate, televideo gradually consumed a greater proportion of the 
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adjudication of those cases pending during the transition period. Third, 
hybrid adjudication occurred when detainees were transferred to different 
detention centers based on available bed space,113 and the transfer triggered 
a change of venue from a televideo court in one jurisdiction to an in-person 
court in the other jurisdiction. Finally, hybrid adjudication occurred when a 
nondetained immigrant appeared in person at an initial master calendar 
hearing but was later ordered detained and assigned to a televideo court. 
Only rarely did hybrid proceedings result from judicial grant of an in-
person hearing to a litigant otherwise assigned to a televideo court. The six 
years of data analyzed show that judges ordered an average of only 102 in-
person hearings per year in detained removal cases that would have 
otherwise proceeded by televideo.114 As one immigration judge confirmed, 
televideo cases generally proceed entirely in televideo unless, for example, 
there is a “speech impediment or they speak Quechua, something like 
that.”115 Narrow judicial allowance of in-person hearings in televideo courts 
is also consistent with appellate court rulings that have upheld televideo 
procedures against due process challenges absent a specific showing of 
prejudice.116 
Moreover, the number of requests for in-person hearings declined 
sharply since 2010. Nationally, respondent requests for in-person hearings 
in detained televideo cases reached a high of 1227 in 2010, and dipped to a 
mere 289 by 2012. Most practitioners whom I interviewed indicated that 
they had either never filed such a request, or that they ceased the practice 
 
113 In some cases, the limited availability of bed space results in detainees being transported to 
locations other than where they were arrested to adjudicate their court case. 2012 YEARBOOK, supra 
note 23, app. A at 19 (“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sometimes moves detained aliens 
between detention facilities.”). See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Due Process and 
Immigrant Detainee Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to 
Counsel, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 17, 60 (2011) (arguing that the “nationwide game of immigration 
prison hopscotch” violates the right to counsel). 
114 This average of 102 hearings a year represents less than 0.05% of detained hearings adjourned 
between 2007 and 2012. See generally Adjournment Code Memo, supra note 110 (defining 
adjournment coding that applies to grants of in-person hearings in lieu of televideo hearings). This 
finding is also consistent with EOIR’s own monitoring of televideo usage in San Antonio. Of the 842 
televideo hearings included in EOIR’s San Antonio study, only four were converted to in-person 
hearings. VTC REVIEW, supra note 6, at 7. 
115 Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1. EOIR’s own study of televideo usage in San Antonio 
also cites rare examples of deviation from the televideo mode, such as when necessary to “personally 
observe the respondent before making a referral to another agency for further observation/diagnosis or 
looking at marks on the respondent’s body before making a decision in the case.” VTC REVIEW, supra 
note 6, at 7. 
116 See, e.g., Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 383 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that to succeed on a due 
process challenge the immigrant must make a showing that televideo likely impacted the result of the 
proceedings). 
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after having such a motion denied.117 One immigration judge clarified: “I 
certainly think [attorneys] can request” in-person hearings, but “what types 
of factors the judge would consider I don’t know because I haven’t ever 
had anybody request it.”118 
A final important feature of the televideo landscape is its uneven 
distribution across the United States. Although there are sixty different 
immigration court jurisdictions, 84% of all televideo hearings for 2012 
were held in only fifteen jurisdictions.119 In practice, televideo’s 
implementation was concentrated in those jurisdictions that handled large 
numbers of detained cases. As a result, the major drivers of televideo’s 
expansion were jurisdictions located near the border (such as San Antonio, 
El Paso, and Los Angeles), as well as jurisdictions housing major detention 
centers (such as Houston and Elizabeth). 
In conclusion, the empirical evidence just presented demonstrates that 
televideo technology is reserved for the court cases of detainees. As more 
and more immigrants are held in detention centers while awaiting their 
court dates, reliance on televideo has grown dramatically and is now used 
for both pretrial hearings and trials. Rather than a neutral adjudicative tool, 
televideo should be understood as an intentional design element of the 
rapidly evolving detention-to-deportation pipeline. 
 
117 See, e.g., Interview #8 with Clinical Professor, Immigration Clinic, ABA-approved Law Sch. 
(Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with author) (explaining that because immigration judges “have this pressure 
where they have an entire VTC as a protocol,” counsel must make an “extraordinary” showing of 
prejudice that is “so difficult to make that people just don’t bother making it”); Telephone Interview 
#24 with Partner, Mid-Size Law Firm (Sept. 6, 2013) (on file with author) (“I’ve made the objection 
before and it didn’t go well for me.”); Telephone Interview #21 with Detention Attorney, Nonprofit 
Org. (Aug. 22, 2013) (on file with author) (“I made a request at the individual hearings for them to be 
brought in person, which was denied.”); Telephone Interview #25 with Staff Attorney, Nonprofit Org. 
(Sept. 6, 2013) (on file with author) (“It’s not going to happen and so you just have to accept that that’s 
how things are done right now, and so I haven’t heard of anybody objecting [to televideo].”); Telephone 
Interview #35 with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Oct. 9, 2013) (on file with author) (“I filed a motion 
once asking that my client be brought in and not on the video . . . it was denied by the judge on the 
papers. I didn’t try it again.”). 
118 Interview #29 with Representative, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges (Sept. 17, 2013) (on file 
with author); see also Telephone Interview #34 with Clinical Professor, Immigration Clinic, ABA-
approved Law Sch. (Sept. 26, 2013) (on file with author) (explaining she has never filed a motion for an 
in-person hearing and never seen it done in practice); Interview #44 with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm 
(Nov. 20, 2013) (on file with author) (agreeing he personally has never asked for an in-person hearing 
and has never heard of any attorney doing so); Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1 (noting that, 
although elite law firms handling cases pro bono may request in-person hearings, general practitioners 
rarely do so). 
119 These jurisdictions, in order from most televideo hearings to least were: Houston, San Antonio, 
Adelanto, Chicago, Newark, Oakdale, El Paso, Arlington, Detroit, Elizabeth, York, Dallas, Cleveland, 
and Los Fresnos. The remaining 16% of 2012 televideo hearings were spread out among twenty-seven 
other jurisdictions. Six of these jurisdictions had fewer than seven televideo hearings. 
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II. COMPARING OUTCOMES IN TELEVIDEO AND IN-PERSON CASES 
Part II turns to the question of televideo’s assumed functional 
equivalence to in-person adjudication.120 It does so by comparing outcomes 
in televideo cases with similar cases that were adjudicated in person. In this 
analysis, procedural outcomes are considered separately from trial 
outcomes. The key procedural outcomes are (1) obtaining an attorney; (2) 
applying for relief; and (3) applying for voluntary departure. The key trial 
outcomes are (1) termination; (2) relief (if pursued); and (3) voluntary 
departure (if pursued without relief). 
Understanding these outcome comparisons requires an appreciation of 
the two-stage mechanics of removal proceedings. In the first stage of 
removal, as depicted in Figure 5, the judge rules whether to sustain the 
charges contained in the government’s Notice to Appear.121 The judge will 
terminate the case if no proper ground for removal is contained in the 
charging document.122 In contrast, if the judge sustains the charges, the case 
will result in removal at the end of stage one unless the respondent applies 
for relief or the immigration benefit known as voluntary departure.123 
In the second stage of removal, as Figure 5 also highlights, the judge 
adjudicates any application for relief or voluntary departure. 
Approximately one-third of detained removal cases present at least one 
such application and thus proceed to the second stage.124 After considering 
a respondent’s stage two application(s) for relief and/or voluntary 
departure,125 the immigration judge must reach one of three different 
decisions: removal, voluntary departure, or relief.126 
 
120 See, e.g., supra note 14. 
121 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2015). For example, the judge will terminate the case if the respondent is 
a United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident not subject to removal. 
122 In some cases, termination may be requested by the prosecutor. See infra note 164. During the 
six-year period from 2007 to 2012, only 2% of detained removal cases resulted in termination. In 
contrast, for immigrants who were never subject to detention, 20% of removal cases ended in 
termination during the same period.  
123 See supra notes 23, 91–93 (defining the terms relief and voluntary departure). 
124 Specifically, in the National Sample of nonterminated cases (n = 151,025), 9.6% of respondents 
applied for at least one form of affirmative relief, and an additional 24.7% applied for just voluntary 
departure. 
125 To clarify, a respondent may apply for more than one form of relief, such as asylum together 
with cancellation of removal. In addition to seeking relief, a respondent may also seek voluntary 
departure. 
126 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2012) (“At the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration judge 
shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States.”). As Juliet Stumpf aptly points out, 
outcomes available to immigration judges in deportation cases are extremely limited. Juliet Stumpf, 
Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1689 (2009) (contrasting the system for punishment 
in the immigration law to that of the criminal law, which allows for greater proportionality). 
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FIGURE 5: TWO STAGES OF IMMIGRATION REMOVAL 
Before proceeding further, it is important to consider potential bias in 
the comparisons of televideo and in-person case outcomes. One aspect of 
immigration adjudication that reduces bias in measuring the effect of the 
televideo treatment is that cases are assigned randomly to judges by the 
court, without prior review of the charges, attorney representation, claims, 
or available defenses.127 Official docketing policies call for random 
rotational assignment of cases to immigration judges.128 This random 
assignment of cases to judges without evaluation of the merits of the case is 
consistent with my observations in site visits and findings gathered from 
interviews.129 
 
127 Random assignment with respect to the merits of a case is to be distinguished from naturally 
occurring variations in court or judge caseloads that occur as a result of exogenous factors such as 
regional and temporal variations in immigration flows and prosecutorial charging priorities.  
128 See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, UNIFORM DOCKETING SYSTEM MANUAL, at III-1 
(2013) [hereinafter UNIFORM DOCKETING MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/
newudms/DocketManual_12_2013.pdf [http:// perma.cc/2HGM-JBER] (“In multiple Immigration 
Judge courts, cases are assigned to each Immigration Judge’s Master Calendar on a random rotational 
basis . . . .”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT 
VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 104 (2008) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/281794.pdf [http://perma.cc/
37HM-3FRY] (“[I]mmigration judges are reportedly assigned cases randomly within immigration 
courts . . . .”). 
129 Both attorneys and judges explained that case assignment did not take into account the merits of 
the underlying case, but rather was done randomly. See, e.g., Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1 
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Another critical point that reduces potential bias is that the use of 
televideo does not depend on a later review of the merits of the case. As 
established in Part I, once a case begins in one adjudicative mode, it almost 
always continues in that same mode until the case is completed.130 In other 
words, immigration judges do not first hear what a case is about and then 
relegate weaker cases to televideo. Instead, assignment to pure televideo 
versus pure in-person adjudication typically depends on the geographic 
location of the detention center in relation to the judge’s assigned court and 
the technological capacity of the judge’s assigned courtroom. For example, 
not all courtrooms have televideo capacity, thereby requiring in-person 
adjudication. Other courtrooms are located inside or close to detention 
facilities, thereby eliminating the need for videoconferencing. 
These court practices allow for comparisons of case outcomes across a 
sizable dataset containing tens of thousands of observations of televideo 
and in-person adjudication. Nonetheless, this research is an observational 
study, not an experiment. Natural flows in immigration patterns and 
enforcement priorities may insert unintended bias into the analysis.131 The 
unevenness of televideo implementation across the country is another 
potential source of bias.132 The fact that some immigrants are released from 
custody and therefore no longer part of the detained caseload also creates 
some uncertainty in any study of detained immigration cases.133 Finally, 
like in all research based on a review of court data, analysis was limited to 
those variables captured in the court’s files. 
 
(agreeing that detained cases are distributed randomly among immigration judges without regard to 
their substance or merit).  
130 See supra Figure 4 and accompanying text. 
131 By incorporating a regression analysis in my analysis, I controlled for factors such as 
respondent nationality and prosecutorial charge type that could affect case outcomes. See infra notes 
362–71 and accompanying text. 
132 See infra Figure 8 and accompanying discussion. I address this issue with a separate analytical 
approach that looks at just those high-volume jurisdictions that relied most heavily on both televideo 
and in-person adjudication for detained cases. See infra Part II.B. 
133 This concern is mitigated by a number of factors. Many immigrants in detention centers are held 
mandatorily without a statutory right to release. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012), or without a right to a 
custody redetermination before a judge, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). Immigration courts have no 
authority to determine custody status on their own motion, P-C-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 432 (B.I.A. 1991), 
and the majority of release decisions are made by detention officers, rather than courts, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a)(2); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 21, at 73 (finding that among those respondents released from 
detention, 63% never had a custody hearing before an immigration judge). When judges do rule on 
bond conditions, they are instructed to weigh numerous factors related to risk of flight and public safety 
that do not necessarily correlate with case quality. IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK, supra note 10, available 
at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/Bond_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/
3JXA-PBHQ]. Finally, immigrants unable to afford the required bond amount remain detained. See 
supra note 98. 
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To guard against these possible sources of bias, a number of additional 
steps enhance the validity of the comparisons presented in this Part. First, 
only similar types of court cases (e.g., only detained adult removal cases) 
from the two years of most active televideo usage were included in the 
comparisons. Second, the analysis replicated the two-stage decisional 
process of immigration removal proceedings so that outcomes were 
compared only at the same stage.134 Third, four different models for 
statistical analysis were pursued, all of which reached similar conclusions 
regarding televideo’s association with inferior participation levels by 
respondents. These models relied on both a sample of cases from courts all 
across the country, as well as a sample from only those jurisdictions with 
the most active usage of both televideo and in-person adjudication. In 
addition, these analyses included a regression that statistically controlled 
for additional factors that could have potentially affected case outcomes, 
such as representation by counsel, assignment to a particular judge, fiscal 
year of decision, nationality of respondent, and prosecutorial charge type.135 
A. Outcomes in the National and Active Base City Samples 
This Section first compares televideo and in-person case outcomes 
across a National Sample of 153,835 immigration cases. For purposes of 
conducting this comparison, this set of cases was tailored to include only 
adult detained removal cases in which immigration judges reached a 
decision on the merits during fiscal years 2011 and 2012.136 In addition, 
cases involving atypical forms of adjudication were removed, including 
cases involving prisoners whose cases are adjudicated as part of the 
Institutional Hearing Program (IHP),137 and cases decided without a hearing 
pursuant to a stipulation between the parties.138 The resulting National 
 
134 The bifurcation of immigration proceedings into deportability and relief is firmly grounded in 
the immigration law. See, e.g., Bulos, 15 I. & N. Dec. 645, 648–49 (B.I.A. 1976); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.11(d)–(e) (2015). For a graphic depiction of this two-stage process, see supra Figure 5. 
135 The coding methodology used for each of these factors is detailed in Part C of the Appendix. 
136 A more detailed description of the steps taken to compile the National Sample is contained in 
Part A of the Appendix. 
137 The Institutional Hearing Program (IHP) implements a 1986 congressional mandate that the 
Attorney General “shall begin any deportation proceeding as expeditiously as possible” for noncitizens 
convicted of deportable offenses. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3445. The IHP program was officially created in 1988 as part of the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7347(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (1988) (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (Supp. II 1996)) (“The Attorney General shall provide for the availability of special 
deportation proceedings at certain Federal, State, and local correctional facilities for aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies (as defined in [certain sections of the INA]).”). 
138 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2012). See generally Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process 
(Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 
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Sample included 153,835 decisions from fifty-two different court 
jurisdictions and 266 different immigration judges. Approximately one-
fourth of these cases were adjudicated by televideo, and the rest were 
adjudicated in person. 
Across this large National Sample of detained removal cases, 
televideo cases exhibited less engagement in the adversarial process. When 
compared to detained in-person removal cases, detained televideo removal 
cases were less likely to involve counsel (18% in person, versus 15% 
televideo), include an affirmative claim for relief (10% in person, versus 
7% televideo), or contain a request for voluntary departure (25% in person, 
versus 24% televideo). These statistically significant differences in 
procedural outcomes (p < 0.001) are displayed graphically in Figure 6. 
FIGURE 6: NATIONAL SAMPLE PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES, BY ADJUDICATIVE MEDIUM139 
 
Not only did televideo cases in the National Sample include fewer 
attorneys, relief applications, and requests for voluntary departure, but they 
 
475, 509 (2013) (finding that in the mid-to-late 2000s, approximately one in ten removal orders were 
stipulated orders, rather than a product of the adversarial court process). 
139 National Sample n = 153,835 for representation; n = 151,021 for apply for relief and apply for 
voluntary departure only (excluding individuals whose cases were terminated). Differences were 
statistically significant by a two-tailed equality of proportions test: obtain representation, z = 15.3, p < 
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were also twelve days faster on average.140 For those who did not apply for 
relief, detained televideo proceedings were an average of three days shorter 
than comparable in-person cases.141 And, when an application for relief was 
adjudicated (such as asylum or cancellation of removal), on average 
immigration judges reached a final decision a full thirty-eight days faster in 
televideo courtrooms.142 These differences in adjudicative time of the merits 
proceedings in televideo and in-person cases are displayed in Figure 7. 
FIGURE 7: NATIONAL SAMPLE MERITS COMPLETION TIME, BY ADJUDICATIVE MEDIUM 
 
 
140 Twenty-nine days on average for in person (SD = 90), versus seventeen days for televideo (SD 
= 61) (p < 0.001, two-tailed difference of means t-test); median time to completion for both adjudicative 
mediums was one day. For purposes of this Article, the length of court processing time is measured as 
the time from the first hearing at the beginning of the relevant merit’s proceeding (generally the master 
calendar hearing) to the date of the last hearing in the proceeding in which the judge issued the first 
decision on the merits. A similar methodology for measuring court processing time was adopted to 
study the Department of Justice’s Legal Orientation Program. NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF 
JUSTICE, LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM: EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME 
MEASUREMENT REPORT, PHASE II, at 16 n.13, 48, 81–82 (2008) [hereinafter VERA EVALUATION], 
available at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_evalution_updated_5-20-
08.pdf [http://perma.cc/7LFF-DJFX]. 
141 Eleven days on average for in person (SD = 58), versus eight for televideo (SD = 23) (p < 0.001, 
two-tailed difference of means t-test); the median time to completion for both adjudicative mediums is 
one day.  
142 One hundred fifty days on average for in person (SD = 173), versus 112 for televideo (SD = 
185) (p < 0.001, two-tailed difference of means t-test); the median time to completion for merits 











































Note: Total Merits Duration includes median (hollow symbol), average (solid symbol), and 95% confidence intervals for time
from first hearing until last hearing.
109-4 EAGLY MASTER COPY II (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2015 4:42 PM 
109:933 (2015) Remote Adjudication 
963 
Why were televideo cases faster? One clue from the data is that 
televideo cases were less likely to include continuances for additional time 
for the respondent to seek counsel143 or for the respondent to prepare for 
trial.144 Televideo cases were also less likely to include a trial: 14% of in-
person removal cases in the National Sample had an individual hearing 
during the merits proceeding, compared to only 8% of televideo removal 
cases.145 Given that removal cases with attorneys are more likely to include 
claims for relief and therefore trials,146 this finding is also consistent with 
the lower level of attorney representation in televideo cases.147 Multiple 
aspects of the data thus reflect less vigorous litigant involvement in 
televideo cases. 
One possible critique of these results is that comparisons in the 
National Sample were skewed because jurisdictions that actively used both 
adjudicative techniques were effectively being pooled with jurisdictions 
that did not. As would be expected with observational court data, 
jurisdictions have incorporated televideo technology in different ways. 
During the study period, some jurisdictions (such as Newark and Detroit) 
relied almost exclusively on televideo adjudication for detained cases.148 
Other jurisdictions (such as San Francisco and Tucson) had not yet 
integrated televideo technology and continued to use in-person adjudication 
for almost all of their detained cases. In contrast, several major court 
jurisdictions with large numbers of detained cases (such as Houston and 
Los Angeles) were early to adopt televideo adjudication and during the 
 
143 In the National Sample, 13% of televideo cases had at least one hearing adjourned to seek 
counsel, versus 15% for in-person cases (p < 0.001, equality of proportions test). In addition, among 
those respondents who were given at least one continuance to find counsel, televideo respondents were 
less likely to be successful: 36% of in-person respondents with at least one continuance to find counsel 
obtained an attorney, compared to only 29% of televideo respondents (p < 0.001, equality of 
proportions test). 
144 In the National Sample, 10.6% of televideo cases had at least one hearing adjourned for 
respondent or respondent’s attorney preparation time, versus 12.5% for in-person cases (p < 0.001, 
equality of proportions test).  
145 Statistically significant differences in trial rates were even observed among those cases with 
relief applications. In the National Sample, 95% of in-person relief cases included an individual 
hearing, versus 94% of televideo relief cases (p < 0.001, two-tailed difference of proportions test). 
146 In a separate article, Steven Shafer and I find that 86% of respondents who seek relief from 
removal are represented by counsel. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 21, at 22 fig.4.  
147 See supra Figure 6; infra Figure 9.  
148 See infra Figure 8. The number of televideo units varied from base city to base city, as did the 
number of minutes the equipment was used. See Letter from Crystal Souza, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to author (Dec. 16, 2013) (obtained by author with FOIA 
request #2014-2220) (on file with author). For example, records I obtained with a Freedom of 
Information Act request revealed that Memphis had only two pieces of video conferencing equipment 
and only seventy-two minutes of usage in the nine-month period for which data were provided. In 
contrast, during the same time period Los Angeles had over ten pieces of equipment and close to 
200,000 minutes of usage logged. Id. 
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study time period actively used both televideo and in-person methods to 
handle their detained caseloads. These jurisdictions that used both 
adjudicative forms in large numbers of detained hearings may provide the 
best sample for observing adjudication outcomes across televideo and in-
person cases. 
To test this possible interpretation of the results, my second analytic 
approach focuses on a subset of cases selected from those court 
jurisdictions that adjudicated at least 1000 televideo and 1000 in-person 
detained removal cases in the two-year period of interest.149 The eight 
jurisdictions that satisfied these criteria included four Texas base cities 
(Dallas, El Paso, Houston, and San Antonio), two California base cities 
(Adelanto and Los Angeles), and one base city each from Louisiana and 
Pennsylvania (Oakdale and York, respectively). I refer to these eight 
jurisdictions collectively as “Active Base Cities.” 
FIGURE 8: DETAINED REMOVAL CASES IN JURISDICTIONS WITH AT LEAST 1000 TELEVIDEO 
REMOVAL CASES, BY ADJUDICATIVE MEDIUM, FISCAL YEARS 2011–2012 
 
 
149 Creating minimum criteria for adjudicative volume of studied cases is a recognized method for 
improving validity in comparing outcomes across groups of immigration cases. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, 
supra note 128, at 37 n.35, 84 (“We selected these country-immigration court combinations because 
they had a sufficiently large number of immigration judges rendering a sufficiently large number of 
decisions to produce reliable estimates . . . .”); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities 
in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 312, 332, 395–96 (2007) (limiting analysis of 
nondetained asylum decisions to only those courts “that decided at least 1500 asylum cases during the 
relevant time frame”). 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Active Base City Sample included a robust collection of 59,525 
detained removal cases decided by sixty-six different immigration judges. 
Among these detained cases, 42% were adjudicated by televideo, and 58% 
in person. Figure 8 displays the relative breakdown between televideo and 
in-person cases in the eight Active Base Cities. Below the dotted line are 
base cities that also adjudicated at least 1000 televideo cases, but were not 
defined as Active Base Cities because they heard almost all of their 
detained cases by televideo, with few in-person detained cases remaining as 
comparators. 
Analysis of the Active Base City Sample revealed procedural patterns 
similar to those in the National Sample, albeit with somewhat more intense 
disadvantages for respondents in the televideo mode. When compared to 
their in-person counterparts, detained televideo cases in the Active Base 
Cities were significantly less likely to include representation by counsel 
(16% in person, versus 11% televideo), applications for relief (8% in 
person, versus 5% televideo), or requests for voluntary departure (25% in 
person, versus 19% televideo). These statistically significant differences in 
procedural outcomes are displayed in Figure 9. 
FIGURE 9: ACTIVE BASE CITY SAMPLE PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES,  
BY ADJUDICATIVE MEDIUM150 
 
 
150 Active Base City Sample n = 59,525 for representation; n = 58,589 for apply for relief and 
apply for voluntary departure only (excluding individuals whose cases were terminated). Differences 
were statistically significant by a two-tailed equality of proportions test: obtain representation, z = 17.8, 
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In view of the marked procedural differences observed in both 
samples, it makes sense that televideo cases also diverged from in-person 
cases in their overall case outcome. As Figure 10 displays, televideo cases 
in both samples were significantly more likely to end in removal.151 In the 
National Sample, 80% of in-person respondents were ordered removed, 
compared to 83% of televideo respondents. In the Active Base City 
Sample, 83% of in-person respondents were ordered removed, compared to 
88% of televideo respondents. Similarly, as also depicted in Figure 10, 
televideo cases in both samples were less likely than in-person cases to be 
granted relief, allowed to voluntarily depart, or have their cases terminated. 
FIGURE 10: NATIONAL SAMPLE AND ACTIVE BASE CITY SAMPLE OUTCOMES,  
BY ADJUDICATIVE MEDIUM152 
 
This disadvantage in outcomes for televideo cases is reduced, 
however, when cases that sought relief in stage two were analyzed 
 
151 So as to maintain focus on the potential effect of the televideo treatment on trial-level outcomes, 
this Article considers only the initial judicial outcome, rather than any outcome after appeal. Even so, 
appeal is unusual in the context of detention: in the National Sample, only 4% of cases ending in 
removal were appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Moreover, detained cases ending in 
removal were more likely to result in appeal if the case was heard in person (4.3% appealed) instead of 
by televideo (3.3% appealed) (p < 0.001, two-tailed equality of proportions test). 
152 National Sample n = 153,835. Differences were statistically significant by a two-tailed equality 
of proportions test: termination, z = 2.2, p < 0.05; relief, z = 12.2, p < 0.001; removal, z = 16.4, p < 
0.001; voluntary departure, z = 11.2, p < 0.001. Active Base City Sample n = 59,525. Differences were 
statistically significant by a two-tailed equality of proportions test: termination, z = 3.3, p < 0.001; 











National Sample Active Base City Sample
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separately. Among National Sample respondents who sought relief, 
televideo and in-person cases were both granted relief exactly 40% of the 
time.153 In the Active Base City Sample, a statistically significant difference 
in the granting of relief applications appeared (39% for televideo, versus 
44% for in person; p < 0.05).154 However, as the next Section makes clear, 
when additional factors (such as whether the respondent was represented 
by counsel, assigned a particular judge, or charged with removal based on a 
crime) were controlled for in a regression model, this observed difference 
was no longer statistically significant. 
The comparative analysis of case outcomes just presented offers 
important information regarding how televideo adjudication operates on the 
ground. Most strikingly, detained televideo cases exhibited depressed 
engagement with the litigation process. As compared to similar in-person 
adult detained removal cases, televideo cases were less likely to include 
counsel or applications for relief and were adjudicated in less time with 
fewer trials. 
One might question whether these differences found in televideo cases 
occurred because televideo respondents were detained. It is therefore 
important to remind readers once again that all cases included in the 
National and Active Base City Samples are of immigrants held in detention 
during their entire case. In addition, care was taken in constructing both 
data samples to ensure reliable comparisons, including by deleting those 
cases that are not removal cases or where the parties stipulated to 
removal.155 However, it is true that the analysis just presented did not 
statistically control for other case characteristics (such as which judge was 
assigned) or respondent characteristics (such as whether the respondent was 
represented by counsel) that might also be associated with these divergent 
outcomes. The next Section turns to analysis of these additional variables. 
B. Additional Factors that Could Affect Outcomes 
To further assess the validity of this Article’s descriptive comparisons 
between televideo and in-person adjudication, I utilized a sequential logit 
regression model to control for additional factors that could possibly 
 
153 National Sample of relief applicants n = 14,480. Relief not statistically significant, z = .21, p = 
0.83, by a two-tailed equality of proportions test. 
154 Active Base City Sample of relief applicants n = 3975. Relief statistically significant, z = 3.03, p 
< 0.05, by a two-tailed equality of proportions test. 
155 See infra Appendix, Section A. 
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influence outcomes.156 Specifically, this analysis controls for representation 
status, geographic region of nationality, prosecutorial charge type, fiscal 
year of decision, and judge assigned to the case.157 In addition, to further 
enhance reliability, the regression analysis models the two-stage structure 
of removal proceedings introduced earlier. That is, it first considers the 
stage one outcomes of termination versus removal. Second, it considers 
stage two outcomes of relief versus removal or voluntary departure.158 
Applying this logit regression model to both the National and Active 
Base City Samples leads to the same conclusions regarding televideo’s 
effect on litigant participation as do the descriptive comparisons of 
outcomes already introduced. That is, even after controlling for numerous 
factors that could affect outcome, in-person respondents remained 
significantly more likely to engage in the litigation process by retaining 
counsel and seeking relief.159 However, after controlling for those same 
factors, these data failed to reject the null hypothesis regarding outcomes at 
trial on applications for relief: there was no statistically significant 
difference in relief rates across televideo and in-person adjudication.160 
 
156 For a similar example of a sequential logit regression model used to evaluate a two-stage court 
adjudication process, see Kuo-Chang Huang et al., Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Affect 
Case Outcomes? A Natural Experiment in Taiwan, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 113, 121, app. B (2010). 
157 Additional details regarding the coding of each of these variables is provided in the Appendix. 
The analysis discussed in this Section also incorporates a fixed effects regression at the individual-judge 
level to account for unmeasured factors that might lead to lower or higher grant rates before certain 
judges. See infra Appendix & tbls.1 & 2. For other examples of fixed effects modeling in the legal 
scholarship, see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 117–
18 (2013) (utilizing fixed effects to control for state in analyzing the national rollout of a federal 
immigration program known as Secure Communities); Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial 
Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 
180 (2006) (applying fixed effects at the judge level to analyze judicial decisionmaking in the federal 
circuit courts). 
158 For those respondents who applied for relief in stage two (potentially with voluntary departure), 
the judge may have ordered relief, removal, or voluntary departure. For those respondents who only 
applied for voluntary departure in stage two, the judge may have ordered voluntary departure or 
removal. 
159 See infra Appendix tbl.1 (presenting logit regression results based on the Active Base City 
Sample). 
160 Id. 
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FIGURE 11: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR ACTIVE BASE CITY SAMPLE BASED ON A LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION OF PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES, BY ADJUDICATIVE MEDIUM161 
 
Using the Active Base City Sample, Figure 11 provides a visual 
representation of these differences by comparing the predicted outcomes 
for each measure of litigant engagement. As Figure 11 displays, when 
compared to similarly situated, detained televideo respondents, detained in-
person respondents were a remarkable 90% more likely to apply for relief, 
35% more likely to obtain counsel, and 6% more likely to apply only for 
voluntary departure.162 
 
161 Figure 11 displays predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals based on the regression 
results displayed in the “Counsel,” “Relief Application,” and “VD Only Application” columns of Table 
1 in the Appendix, which provide odds ratios comparing the impact of in-person adjudication to 
televideo on selected outcomes. Predicted probabilities based on these estimated odds ratios may 
provide a more intuitive look into the magnitude of the differences in these outcomes.  
162 That is, after controlling for a variety of case- and respondent-specific factors, the relief 
application rate is predicted to increase from 4.5% to 8.6%, the rate of obtaining representation is 
predicted to increase from 11.2% to 15.0%, and the voluntary departure application rate is predicted to 
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FIGURE 12: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR ACTIVE BASE CITY SAMPLE BASED ON A LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION OF JUDICIAL OUTCOMES, BY ADJUDICATIVE MEDIUM163 
 
In contrast to the predicted differences in procedural outcomes just 
discussed, the predicted differences for relief and voluntary departure in the 
Active Base City Sample were not significant. As shown in Figure 12, after 
controlling for the same set of variables, there was no statistically 
significant finding that judges assigned disadvantage to televideo cases in 
ruling on relief and voluntary departure applications. Although judges were 
somewhat less likely to terminate televideo cases (1.4% for televideo, 
versus 1.7% for in person; p < 0.01), technical aspects of termination 
practice in immigration court make it difficult to draw meaningful 
conclusions from this data point.164 
Applying the same logit regression model to the National Sample 
yielded consistent results to those found in the Active Base City Sample.165 
 
163 Figure 12 displays average predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals based on the 
regression results displayed in the “Termination,” “Grant Relief Application,” and “Grant VD Only 
Application” columns of Table 1 in the Appendix.  
164 For example, some of these terminations could reflect a prosecutor’s request for termination in 
exchange for the respondent’s agreement to a prehearing order of voluntary departure. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 240.25(d)(1) (2015). Available court data do not allow for measurement of this practice. 
Alternatively, in some cases prosecutors may file a new removal charge in a subsequent proceeding. 
See, e.g., Interview #29, supra note 118 (agreeing that many times the “government moves to terminate 
for various reasons like the NTA wasn’t proper” and then refiles the case). Of the small number of 
detained cases in the National Sample that resulted in termination, about 4% included a second Notice 
to Appear. 
165 Regression results from the National Sample are contained in Table 2 of the Appendix. 
Voluntary Departure
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There were no statistically significant differences in judicial decisions of 
termination and grants of relief or voluntary departure. In addition, 
statistically significant differences in litigant engagement remained, as 
measured by retention of counsel and applications for relief.166 
This null result for judicial decisionmaking at trial means that the logit 
regression model, as applied to both samples, could not detect statistically 
significant differences in relief and voluntary departure grant rates for 
televideo compared with in-person cases. This finding does not, however, 
eliminate the possibility that undetected discrimination against televideo 
cases might occur at the individual case level. For example, the fact that 
fewer televideo respondents brought claims in the first place could mean 
that the televideo claims were stronger on average, and therefore perhaps 
merited grants at a higher rate. In addition, it is possible that individual 
judges reacted differently to the televideo treatment.167 The regression 
model addresses these possibilities by controlling for judge, case, and 
respondent characteristics that are associated with each case. Nonetheless, 
such models cannot eliminate the possibility of omitted variable bias. 
The analysis presented in this Section complements the descriptive 
comparisons presented earlier with a regression model that controls for 
numerous factors that could influence case outcomes. These factors include 
respondent-specific factors of representation status, geographic region of 
nationality, and prosecutorial charge type, as well as case-specific factors 
of fiscal year of decision and judge assigned to the case. The resulting 
quantitative analysis yields an asymmetrical result: televideo was 
associated with fewer assertions of rights by litigants, but not more judicial 
denials of relief from removal. To further probe televideo adjudication, Part 
III supplements these findings with interviews and observations from the 
field. 
III. ON THE INSIDE OF TELEVIDEO COURTROOMS 
I now turn to my qualitative research to interpret the adjudicative 
patterns described in Part II.168 Relying on the accounts of the people most 
 
166 However, in the National Sample there is no statistically significant difference in the rate of 
applying for voluntary departure. See infra Appendix tbl.2. 
167 Recent research on Social Security hearings has found that while some administrative law 
judges showed lower allowance rates in video hearings, others showed higher allowance rates. HAROLD 
J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO REPORT ON ACHIEVING GREATER 
CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND 
SUGGESTED REFORMS 40 (2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Statistical_Appendix_Final_4-3-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/93FT-SU4A]. 
168 For a description of this qualitative research, see supra notes 31–42 and accompanying text. 
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familiar with immigration adjudication,169 as well as my own observations 
from the pews of immigration courtrooms and the halls of detention 
centers, I identify the complex ways in which video adjudication interacts 
with the deportation process. Judicial decisionmaking at trial is discussed 
first, followed by litigant engagement in the adversarial process. 
A. Judicial Decisionmaking 
I can’t honestly say to you that I think the outcome [in my televideo cases] 
would have been different in person. That’s including cases I’ve won and 
cases I’ve lost.170 
Attorneys I interviewed cited many frustrations with video 
appearances. Primary among these concerns were interference with 
lawyers’ ability to guide their clients and technical interruptions in the 
video feed.171 These criticisms of televideo were often expressed in strong 
terms: some attorneys said they “hated” televideo; others stressed that it 
“dehumanized” their clients.172 
Curiously, however, when pressed to explain whether video actually 
interfered with their ability to win a specific claim on behalf of a client, 
most responded consistently with the results of the quantitative data. That 
is, attorneys confessed that they could not identify a case in which 
televideo adversely affected the outcome of their clients’ claims for relief. 
As one attorney succinctly explained, “I can’t think of any case that I’ve 
handled where I could say that [televideo] might have made a 
difference.”173 Another commented: “[I]f you have a decent case [for 
relief], you will still probably win it. I don’t think just because you’re doing 
it over video, that’s going to determine whether or not you win the case.”174 
 
169 As sociologists who study legal consciousness have found, often it is the accounts of 
participants in the system that best capture the actual practice and use of law. PATRICIA EWICK & 
SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998). 
170 Interview #44, supra note 118. 
171 See, e.g., infra notes 239, 264, 274. 
172 See, e.g., infra notes 200, 211, 263. 
173 Telephone Interview #18 with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Aug. 21, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
174 Telephone Interview #43 with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Oct. 30, 2013) (on file with 
author). Many other practicing attorneys made similar statements. See, e.g., Interview #40 with 
Attorney, Mid-Size Law Firm (Oct. 22, 2013) (on file with author) (“I can’t honestly say that I felt 
somehow unfairly treated because of that [video] arrangement.”); Interview #16 with Supervisory 
Attorney, Nonprofit Org. (Aug. 9, 2013) (on file with author) (“I would offer that a good attorney or a 
good judge is probably going to be as good on VTC as they are in person.”); Telephone Interview #22 
with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Sept. 3, 2013) (on file with author) (“I don’t feel like my 
presentation really suffered [over video].”); Interview #8, supra note 117 (“Most of the cases that we 
end up getting, they win. So they win despite VTC, right, which is great.”); Interview #30 with Assoc., 
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This Article’s failure to reject the null hypothesis that decisionmaking at 
trial is unrelated to adjudicative mode thus suggests that the intuitions of 
these attorneys in the televideo trenches may be correct. 
What accounts for this lack of an observed difference in outcomes 
across televideo and in-person trials? Despite the sharp criticism that 
routinely accompanies discussion of immigration judges,175 there are a 
number of explanations for why their trial decisions may turn on factors 
other than what is gleaned over a video screen. As I observed in my site 
visits, immigration judges often rested their decisions on purely legal 
determinations rather than individualized fact-finding that relied on 
interaction over the television screen.176 Moreover, as social science 
research has underscored, preexisting policy preferences of immigration 
judges can profoundly influence their resolution of cases, especially given 
the “institutional constraints under which judges operate, including the 
vagueness of the law, the lack of concrete evidence, and the difficulty of 
assessing credibility.”177 
Even when fact-finding is determinative, immigration judges may 
privilege those cases with nontestimonial “corroborative printed proof,” 
rather than those that rely solely on the first-hand testimony of the 
applicant.178 The immigration bench’s capacity to weigh testimony without 
regard to presentational medium has also been guided by a series of 
reforms designed to increase consistency in case outcomes. In 2006, the 
Justice Department began to standardize procedures in the immigration 
 
Small-Size Law Firm (Sept. 17, 2013) (on file with author) (“I think that if you are doing everything 
you are supposed to and you are well prepared, any inconvenience of the televideo is minimal.”). 
175 See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he adjudication of 
[immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal 
justice.”).  
176 A number of scholars have identified the importance of legal determinations, in addition to 
factual determinations, in immigration courts. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman, Measuring Inconsistency, 
Indeterminacy, and Error in Adjudication, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 40, 73 (2014) (clarifying that 
decisionmaking in immigration cases “involve[s] fact-finding as well as legal interpretation”); Steven 
H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 413, 424 (2007) (noting that a judge’s decision “might be one of ‘pure’ law . . . [o]r it might be 
an assessment of the asylum seeker’s credibility, including whether the person is truthful, reliable, and 
perceptive”); Audrey Macklin, Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in the Refugee 
Context, INT’L ASS’N REFUGEE L. JUDGES at 134, 134 (1988) (explaining that credibility determinations 
in asylum cases are often so “hard” that decisions instead rely on legal determinations). 
177 Linda Camp Keith et al., Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates Among Immigration 
Judges: An Attitudinal and Cognitive Approach, 35 LAW & POL’Y 261, 264, 283 (2013). 
178 Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the 
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 433, 474–79 (1992) (finding in an observational study of asylum adjudication that 
immigration judges often privileged “printed corroborative proof, which they considered to be 
‘objective’ evidence,” over testimonial evidence).  
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courts,179 including by creating an immigration court practice manual180 and 
publishing an enhanced immigration judge benchbook.181 The immigration 
courts also developed programs to more closely supervise judges with 
unusually high or low grants of relief.182 Training for new immigration 
judges now emphasizes aspects of credibility beyond demeanor, such as 
factual inconsistencies in the applicant’s testimony.183 As one immigration 
judge explained, when judges are taught to focus on the content of 
testimony rather than nonverbal cues,184 video does not make a difference 
because “you really watch a person on that screen and you really pretty 
much can hear them the same way you can hear them [in person].”185 
Televideo also operates in a context in which judicial maneuvering has 
already been severely constrained by changes in the immigration law and 
prosecutorial practices. Since the early 1990s, Congress has broadened 
standards for removal, while eliminating and reducing many forms of 
relief.186 Furthermore, despite a growing recognition of the discretion held 
 
179 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines 
Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.
justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html [http://perma.cc/E4BL-DP2R] (announcing a 
new effort “to improve the performance and quality of work of the nation’s immigration court system”). 
180 COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 84. 
181 IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK, supra note 10, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
immigration-judge-benchbook [http://perma.cc/559Z-FLG5]. 
182 GAO REPORT, supra note 128, at 38. In a seminal study of judicial decisionmaking in 
nondetained asylum cases, scholars found significant disparity in grant rates for asylum cases despite 
random judicial assignment. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 149. 
183 See, e.g., Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1 (explaining that since 2006 judges have “tons 
more training,” including training “to not rest too much on body language or whether people have 
downcast eyes and things like that in making credibility determinations”). Such attentiveness to what 
constitutes a proper adverse credibility finding is informed by the growing realization that humans—
even those who are highly trained—are poor lie detectors. See, e.g., Bella M. DePaulo et al., The 
Accuracy–Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 346, 346 (1997) (finding that the average person’s ability to detect deception is barely better than 
flipping a coin).  
184 Social science research has found that human lie detection can be enhanced by focusing on 
speech content rather than on visual information. See Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, 
Deception, and Credibility: Confident but Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 816 (2002). The 
importance of substance rather than nonverbal cues is particularly critical in the immigration context, 
given that respondents hail from a range of cultures and backgrounds where identical nonverbal cues 
can mean quite different things. 
185 Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1 (“I don’t really think that [video impacts the ability to 
observe demeanor] because you really watch a person on that screen and you really pretty much can 
hear them the same way you can hear them [in person].”). 
186 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited 
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1936 (2000) (showing how the 1996 
amendments to the immigration law “drastically changed the consequences of criminal convictions for 
lawful permanent residents”). For a thoughtful discussion of how these changes in the immigration law 
have redefined the obligations of criminal defense counsel, see Yolanda Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen 
Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31 (2010). 
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by immigration prosecutors,187 exercise of such discretion in the context of 
detention is rare. Quite the opposite: in the detained courtrooms I observed, 
adversarial prosecutors mechanically contested all claims, as they managed 
crushing caseloads that often did not allow time to research the merits of 
the governing law or underlying facts.188 Not surprisingly, detained 
immigration court records I reviewed included virtually no discretionary 
case closures by prosecutors.189 
Another important factor is the severe resource constraints facing 
immigration courts, particularly those adjudicating detained cases. Due to 
limited bed space and the high costs associated with detention, the 
Department of Justice now prioritizes detained case completions over those 
of nondetained respondents.190 In San Antonio, for example, I routinely 
observed judges explaining to detainees that their Washington 
Headquarters required them to complete all detained cases in sixty days.191 
This expedited scheduling practice, known as the rocket docket,192 has 
pressurized case review in precisely those courts where the televideo 
 
187 Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All ICE 
Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal 
of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Memo from John Morton], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL44-ABZC?type=pdf] (setting forth 
the government’s plan to prioritize deportations based on seriousness of the immigrant’s criminal 
record); see also SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015) (describing the history, theory, and application of 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President 
and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (revealing how the executive exerts discretion in 
deciding who is selected for deportation from the United States). 
188 David Martin made a similar observation in the context of asylum adjudication. David A. 
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
1247, 1308 (1990) (“In busy districts, trial attorneys have little time to prepare the cases. Sometimes 
they are only able to review the file for the first time while direct examination is proceeding.”).  
189 For example, records for fiscal year 2012 included 437 prosecutorial discretion terminations and 
9120 prosecutorial discretion administrative closures. However, only twenty-six of these terminations 
and twenty-four of these closures involved detained removal cases. The rest were all in nondetained 
removal cases. Recent empirical work by Nina Rabin also suggests that the culture of the prosecutorial 
agency, which tends to “view all immigrants as criminal threats,” may contribute to the refusal by 
prosecutors to exercise discretion. Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and 
Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195, 196 
(2014). 
190 Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court System: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2011/EOIR 
testimony05182011.pdf [http://perma.cc/C2BQ-KMLH] (statement of Juan P. Osuna, Director, Exec. 
Office for Immigration Review) (“The highest priority cases for EOIR are those involving detained 
aliens.”). Judith Resnik’s research on judges identifies a broader trend among the judiciary toward 
active management of court calendars in order to increase efficiency and speed case disposition. Judith 
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 379 (1982). 
191 See VTC REVIEW, supra note 6, at Executive Summary (explaining that in the San Antonio 
Immigration Court, “[t]he new Case Completion Goal for detained cases is to have 85% completed 
within 60 days”). 
192 Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1. 
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experiment is ongoing. The end result is that, regardless of presentational 
medium, judges presiding over these cases have little time to engage in 
detailed fact analysis or creative discretionary decisionmaking. 
This Article’s null result for trial outcomes is also in keeping with a 
small body of laboratory-based experiments on video use at trial. Research 
conducted primarily on remote child victim testimony in simulated criminal 
trials has found that televised testimony has no observable effect on jury 
verdicts. Some studies found that observing testimony by video, rather than 
in person, decreased jurors’ initial ratings of a child victim’s honesty, 
intelligence, or other similar qualities.193 However, such results appear to be 
temporary,194 as post-deliberation verdicts on whether to convict remained 
unchanged across video and in-person modes.195 
A smattering of other studies conducted on videoconferencing’s use in 
civil trials has likewise concluded that trial outcomes remain unchanged 
when video is introduced. For example, one study found that a videotape 
 
193 See, e.g., Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit 
Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 
199 (1998) (concluding that mock jurors gave lower ratings for honesty, attractiveness, and intelligence 
of child witnesses appearing by closed-circuit television); Sara Landström et al., Children’s Live and 
Videotaped Testimonies: How Presentation Mode Affects Observers’ Perception, Assessment and 
Memory, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 333, 344 (2007) (finding that jurors perceived in-
person child testimony as more convincing than child testimony by video); Janet K. Swim et al., 
Videotaped Versus In-Court Witness Testimony: Does Protecting the Child Witness Jeopardize Due 
Process?, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 603, 626–27 (1993) (documenting that live testimony received 
higher juror ratings for accuracy, consistency, and confidence). 
194 See, e.g., David F. Ross et al., The Impact of Protective Shields and Videotape Testimony on 
Conviction Rates in a Simulated Trial of Child Sexual Abuse, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 563 (1994) 
(finding video testimony had no impact on post-deliberation jury verdicts despite the fact that jurors 
interrupted right after the child’s testimony were less likely to perceive the defendant as guilty in the 
video medium); Swim et al., supra note 193, at 626 (concluding that, although jurors were less likely to 
convict at the point of pre-deliberation in the video setting, this difference disappeared after deliberation 
with other jurors). 
195 See, e.g., Tania E. Eaton et al., Child–Witness and Defendant Credibility: Child Evidence 
Presentation Mode and Judicial Instructions, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1849, 1856 (2001) (finding 
no significant difference based on presentation mode in the post-deliberation phase in “the primary 
variables of child-witness overall credibility, defendant credibility, and defendant guilt”); Goodman et 
al., supra note 193, at 198 (concluding that the use of closed-circuit technology for child witness did not 
diminish jurors’ ability to identify inaccurate testimony; nor did it change jurors’ post-deliberation 
conviction rates); Rod C.L. Lindsay et al., What’s Fair When a Child Testifies?, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 870, 884–85 (1995) (reporting no difference in juror verdicts or perception of witnesses 
across abuse cases where the child victim testified in open court, with a barrier between the child and 
the defendant, or through a closed circuit television); Holly K. Orcutt et al., Detecting Deception in 
Children’s Testimony: Factfinders’ Abilities to Reach the Truth in Open Court and Closed-Circuit 
Trials, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 366 (2001) (finding no evidence that using closed-circuit 
television for victim testimony influenced jurors’ post-deliberation decisions); Ross et al., supra note 
194, at 558–60 (reporting that the medium used for child testimony in a mock child abuse trial “did not 
have a significant impact on conviction rates” after jurors deliberated or on perceptions of the victim’s 
or defendant’s credibility); Swim et al., supra note 193, at 617, 620 (concluding that medium of 
presentation had no significant effect on perceptions of the defendant, perceptions of the victim, or post-
deliberation verdicts). 
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trial format did not significantly affect attributions of negligence by the 
jury.196 Another found that the appearance of an expert witness by video did 
not alter the jury’s verdict.197 Yet, these researchers assumed that the case 
had reached the trial stage and ignored the potential for video to affect 
whether the case reached the trial stage in the first place. 
A rare observational study on pretrial use of video technology 
examined court data from criminal bail hearings in Chicago. Applying an 
interrupted time series analysis, the authors concluded that over time the 
abrupt switch in adjudication method from in person to video “caused a rise 
in felony bond amounts.”198 While this research did demonstrate that 
criminal defendants were disadvantaged by higher bail amounts under the 
video regime, the data did not allow researchers to separately analyze 
video’s relationship to judicial decisionmaking (e.g., whether bond was 
ordered and, if so, the amount) and litigant engagement (e.g., the amount of 
bail defendants requested and whether defense attorneys represented their 
clients at the hearings).199 This limitation makes the research, like previous 
studies in the field, incomplete because it cannot disentangle the 
complementary pressures of judicial decisionmaking and litigant 
engagement. In contrast, the immigration data studied in this Article allow 
for precisely this type of analysis. 
In sum, immigration case outcomes and adjudicative medium are 
certainly linked, but the analysis presented in this Article does not support 
the trial disadvantage rationale that commentators emphasize. As this 
Section discussed, a number of factors may contribute to the consistency in 
grant rates observed across televideo and in-person detained removal cases. 
The next Section turns to the related question of why reliance on video is 
associated with a troubling decrease in litigant engagement. 
B. Litigant Disengagement 
The trial-focused debate surrounding courtroom technology has 
overlooked how technology might influence the foundational process of 
 
196 Gerald R. Miller et al., Using Videotape in the Courtroom: A Four-Year Test Pattern, 55 U. 
DET. J. URB. L. 655, 661–62 (1978). 
197 Fredric I. Lederer, Wired: What We’ve Learned About Courtroom Technology, CRIM. JUST., 
Winter 2010, at 18, 22. 
198 Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings 
on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 869, 887–91 (2010). 
199 The study’s authors did not ignore the possibility of depressed litigant engagement. See id. at 
898 (hypothesizing that defendants in televideo hearings could have been “discouraged” from 
“speaking up” during the bond hearing, perhaps altering results). However, this theory could not be 
tested, as the authors did not analyze any measure of attorney participation or claimmaking by the 
defendants. 
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disputing removal. That is, concerns about adjudicative medium have been 
framed by existing disputes to be decided at trial, rather than by claims in 
danger of not being brought. This Article’s finding of a robust association 
between depressed claimmaking and televideo suggests that technology 
exerts an indirect influence on overall case outcomes that undermines the 
fairness of the immigration system. This Section draws on my field 
research to explain why these depressed engagement levels might occur. 
1. Respondent Alienation. 
[N]one of the people detained there like [televideo hearings]. Everyone hates 
it. . . . They say they feel like their due process rights are being violated—that 
they’re not getting a full fair hearing. I mean even the ones, even people who 
win. . . . “How is it fair? I can’t see the judge. This is my day in court and the 
judge can’t even see me. I can’t hear the judge. I can’t see everyone in the 
courtroom at the same time. I don’t know who to look at. . . . If I were there in 
person, I could just hand [my documents] up [to the judge] and now I have to 
mail [them] . . . .”200 
One important factor that may decrease the participation of televideo 
litigants is the perception that not being brought to the courtroom is unfair. 
As reflected in the above quote from an attorney who conducts know-your-
rights presentations in detention centers, detainees do not like televideo. 
They feel the procedure, with all its limitations, is simply unjust.201 
The carceral environment of the remote court location contributes to 
the sense of unfairness that video respondents feel.202 The remote locations 
where litigants sit include none of the ceremony and decorum of the 
traditional courtroom. An immigration attorney who once appeared by 
televideo with her client from a jail provided a detailed description of the 
remote setup: 
The [remote] courtroom is a large multipurpose room . . . with tiny rooms 
within that room, and so you’re kind of in this little closed-in space with the 
door closed and you sit in a plastic chair right in front of a TV screen. And it’s 
really awkward. . . . I mean you’re in this tiny, tiny room with the door closed 
and there is this giant TV screen in front of you with this camera pointing at 
your face and you’re trying to lean in to make sure the judge can hear you but 
you can’t really tell. . . . It’s just distracting. . . . You have the judge and then 
you can see your face in a tiny screen in the corner[.]203 
 
200 Telephone Interview #23, supra note 99. 
201 As discussed further in this Section, many other interviewees expressed similar sentiments 
regarding the perceived unfairness of the video procedure. 
202 As Sharon Dolovich has noted, incarceration in the United States “is a distinct cultural practice 
with its own aesthetic and technique.” Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 
3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 237 (2009). 
203 Telephone Interview #25, supra note 117. 
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In my own visits to these remote locations, I had a similar reaction to 
the starkness of the video appearance rooms. Some of the hearing locations 
appeared to be broom closets equipped with a television and monitored by 
a guard sitting in the hallway. Others were larger utility-style conference 
rooms with gleaming concrete floors where respondents wearing prison-
issued jumpsuits sat in rows of plastic lawn chairs—always in the presence 
of a guard rather than court staff. After their cases were called, the 
detainees were taken back to their cells in groups by a second guard.204 The 
entire experience was full of constant reminders that we were in a jail, 
rather than a courtroom. 
Several interviewees emphasized that the televideo court process 
seems less “real.” As one judge put it, “I think with television there is 
always the screen—there is always the disconnect of it being something 
other than your actual reality.”205 Therefore, immigrants might not realize 
that “it’s serious business” in the same way as they would if they were 
actually “in the courtroom.”206 A nonprofit attorney who observed 
immigrants representing themselves in video hearings expressed a similar 
sentiment: 
[T]he way that [the detainees] were approaching the [court]room with the 
video was very different than what you see with detainees before the judge 
here. . . . I would say the detainees [in the video court] had more of a 
nonchalant attitude—that it wasn’t, like I said, real. Whereas when you watch 
detainees generally they get into a courtroom and they act pretty somber. I 
guess you’d say that they realize the seriousness of the proceedings. But I 
don’t think that gets translated well when it’s on a video.207 
Immigrants in the video appearance rooms often strained to figure out 
what was happening in the real courtroom. At times it was almost 
impossible to decipher from the fuzzy panoramic courtroom view on the 
screen whether it was the judge or someone else speaking. Other times the 
view on the television screen was only of one corner of the courtroom, such 
as the interpreter’s face or the judge’s desk. Remote observers were left to 
decipher the source of the various courtroom voices based only on audio 
cues. 
 
204 In some instances, the remote location was an actual EOIR courtroom within the detention 
center. For example, in Pearsall, Texas, some detainees were brought to a formal courtroom located 
within the detention center, but instead connected via televideo to a judge sitting in a second courtroom 
in San Antonio.  
205 Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1. 
206 Id. 
207 Interview #39 with Soc. Responsibility Dir., Nonprofit Org. (Oct. 22, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
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Sometimes it was hard to hear. In one video location at a county jail, 
hallway noise coming into the video room contributed to the chaotic 
atmosphere. In a particularly memorable case, a detainee listening to an 
immigration judge on the screen became so frustrated by inaudible 
interruptions and echoes caused by simultaneous translation that he 
physically pressed his ear against the television speaker.208 
Respondents appearing at master calendar hearings in the remote 
video rooms often appeared confused and unsure where to focus their eyes 
or direct their voices. Only rarely were respondents asked if they could see 
or hear what was coming in through the video feed. Frequently they did not 
understand whether the judge was asking them a question, or instead 
addressing someone else in the courtroom.209 A few judges became 
impatient and told video respondents to “wake up” or “pay attention,” 
further adding to the tension in the remote video room.210 One guard told 
me that the respondents called the judge who appeared on their video 
screen “el diablo,” Spanish for “the devil.” 
Many interviewees described the system of video adjudication as 
dehumanizing. Attorneys felt that their clients were not being treated with 
dignity when forced to appear over video, rather than seated together with 
their attorney in court. As a clinical law professor who regularly practices 
in immigration courts explained: 
[Videoconferencing] completely dehumanizes the process for the person 
going through it . . . [It] reduces the weight of what the hearing is about. . . . 
[R]emoval decisions can have this tremendous effect on all aspects of your 
life. . . . [Yet] the fact that we don’t bother having the person in the room to 
make those decisions . . . [reflects] the [low] level of dignity that [is] give[n to 
the respondents in videoconferenced removal cases].211 
 
208 In contrast, several European countries require that courtroom videoconferencing be “true-to-
life”—a requirement that demands high-quality images with accurate sound, no transmission delays, 
and perceptible facial and lip movements. Peter van Rotterdam & Ronald van den Hoogen, True-to-Life 
Requirements for Using Videoconferencing in Legal Proceedings, in VIDEOCONFERENCE AND REMOTE 
INTERPRETING IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 187, 188 (Sabine Braun & Judith L. Taylor eds., 2012). 
209 See Telephone Interview #25, supra note 117 (“You can’t tell who [the judge is] directing his 
comments to and so you don’t know whether you’re supposed to respond. And when you’re witnessing 
all of this [over video] in a language that you don’t understand . . . it is a nightmare.”). 
210 Attorneys interviewed noted similar issues. See, e.g., Telephone Interview #23, supra note 99 
(“[W]e have issues with people not being able to hear, and unfortunately, I mean we do love our 
detained judges, but they get irritated and sarcastic. And if someone says ‘pardon me’ or ‘excuse me’ 
multiple times, that can derail things, unfortunately.”); Telephone Interview #26 with Sec’y, Bd. of 
Dirs., Nonprofit Org. (Sept. 10, 2013) (on file with author) (explaining that when she attended a video 
hearing with her client at the remote location she could not hear the case being called and the judge 
“started yelling at me, like, ‘Can’t you hear me?’”). 
211 Interview #8, supra note 117. 
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A judge similarly expressed that her main concern was that video does not 
humanize respondents as participants in their own case: 
And for me I guess the main thing is the humanity thing . . . . [I]t really is like 
television. And then when the show is over you turn it off and go on your 
way. So to me it’s kind of dehumanizing. That’s my main concern about it.212 
A number of legal scholars have argued that individual dignity is 
promoted by providing litigants the opportunity to participate in the 
adversarial process.213 The immigration system’s experiment with televideo 
unearths something more—that the court procedures chosen to facilitate 
litigant participation are themselves linked to whether participation actually 
occurs. Because televideo diminishes the dignity of the courtroom, litigants 
may simply refuse to partake in the process. In other words, they may deem 
the video procedure not deserving of their implicit legitimization through 
claimmaking. Under such conditions, putting up a fight might not be worth 
the extra time spent in detention. 
Officials guiding my tour through the Corrections Corporation of 
America facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, informed me that the average 
immigrant’s stay at the facility was approximately forty-five days. Yet, 
average stays are uninformative in the context of court adjudication. The 
reality is that there is a large discrepancy between the number of detention 
days of those who seek relief and those who do not. The price of bringing a 
claim while in detention is high: over one hundred days in detention.214 
Being forced to endure these additional days in a harsh institutional setting 
without any promise of being brought face-to-face to meet the judge may 
be enough to convince some video litigants to relinquish otherwise viable 
claims to remain in the United States. 
The idea that litigants would forego claims even if factually innocent 
is well documented in the criminal justice system.215 The threat of 
prolonged pretrial detention may be enough to motivate a plea of guilty so 
 
212 Interview #29, supra note 118. 
213 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177–80 (1985) 
(arguing that allowing for participation in the legal process has intrinsic value in promoting individual 
dignity); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) (“[G]rant[ing] to 
the individuals or groups against whom government decisions operate the chance to participate in the 
processes by which those decisions are made . . . expresses their dignity as persons.”). 
214 This calculation is based on my analysis of removal cases in the National Sample. Compare 
supra note 141 (average adjudication times for cases without claims), with supra note 142 (average 
adjudication times for cases with claims). 
215 As Josh Bowers has put it, “[i]t is hardly a new observation that guilty pleas may prove 
attractive to the innocent.” Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1120 (2008). 
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as to avoid the punishment inherent in the process.216 Similar pressures are 
certainly relevant to the immigration detention context. As one judge 
confessed, respondents who could qualify for relief regularly “take removal 
orders.”217 Importantly, this study finds that these dynamics increase with 
the video procedure. 
Although there is no research on immigration detainees’ psychological 
reactions to televideo appearances, social science research in related areas 
is valuable. In particular, studies have found that remote communication 
through screens demands higher cognitive functioning. For example, court 
interpreters who appear remotely via videoconference become tired faster 
and suffer inferior performance.218 They also experience an overall feeling 
of alienation from the court process.219 Similar effects of increased 
cognitive load and fatigue could be linked to the depressed levels of 
engagement observed in televideo litigants. 
An early study of remote adjudication in criminal courts evaluated the 
use of a “video phone” at arraignments. Researchers found that defendants 
thought the practice, which required them to remain at the jail rather than 
come to the courtroom, “abridged their right to appear in person before the 
judge.”220 When asked why, defendants explained they were dissatisfied 
with the procedure because of the inability to “tell my side to the judge.”221 
Even though an in-person arraignment did not typically allow defendants to 
discuss the facts of their case with the judge, defendants felt aggrieved by 
their physical separation from the judge and their attorney.222 
Other research on courts also supports the view that procedures can 
shape how litigants rate the fairness of the adjudicatory system. In a series 
of classic studies, Tom Tyler and other social scientists demonstrated that 
participants’ perceptions of fairness are influenced by factors such as 
 
216 For an early account of these issues, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE 
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).  
217 Interview #7 with Representative, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file 
with author). Several other interviewees made similar comments. See, e.g., Interview #8, supra note 117 
(noting that a “frustrating part as a lawyer” is seeing cases where “the person took an order of removal 
when they had a form of relief,” often because “they didn’t think they had a chance to win”). 
218 See, e.g., Barbara Moser-Mercer, Remote Interpreting: Issues of Multi-Sensory Integration in a 
Multilingual Task, 50 META: TRANSLATORS’ J. 727 (2005) (finding that video interpreting utilizes more 
brain power and leads to a poorer performance, causing interpreters to become tired faster).  
219 See, e.g., Ilan Roziner & Miriam Shlesinger, Much Ado About Something Remote: Stress and 
Performance in Remote Interpreting, 12 INTERPRETING 214 (2010) (concluding that remote interpreting 
is associated with “considerable psychological effects,” including increased “feelings of isolation and 
alienation” among interpreters). 
220 Warner A. Eliot, The Video Telephone in Criminal Justice: The Phoenix Project, 55 U. DET. J. 
URB. L. 721, 749 (1978). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
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respectful treatment by the judge and the opportunity to speak in court.223 
That is, litigant beliefs about court systems are often based on assessments 
of the process, rather than reactions to substantive case outcomes. New 
research by Emily Ryo suggests that a similar phenomenon could be at play 
in immigration law—namely, that immigrants’ perceptions of procedural 
justice in enforcement may inform their overall respect for the immigration 
law regardless of whether lawful status is actually obtained.224 
Detainees’ assessment of the fairness of the immigration court may 
similarly be burdened by a negative perception of the video procedure, 
rather than an accurate assessment of the possible outcome if they were to 
pursue relief.225 Indeed, my research shows that once a claim is actually 
filed from detention, the chance of winning that claim is fairly high: a full 
40% of detainees who sought relief won their claims at trial.226 Moreover, 
this success rate was the same in the video and in-person formats.227 
Given these rather favorable odds, why is it that detained video 
litigants are not making claims in greater numbers? Refusal to participate in 
a procedure perceived as unjust and dehumanizing is part of the story, but 
there are additional explanations for the decreased engagement of televideo 
litigants. The discussion that follows identifies some of the logistical 
challenges faced by respondents who pursue litigation over a video screen. 
2. Complication of Litigation Mechanics. 
[F]or a judge to require that you be ready for an individual hearing over 
televideo two or three days ahead of time; and your documents got in the day 
before because they have to go through the entire prison system in order for 
you to get them; and then you’ve got to get them translated and then get them 
 
223 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 106 (1988) (“The perception that one has had an opportunity to express oneself and to have 
one’s views considered by someone in power plays a critical role in fairness judgments.”); Jonathan D. 
Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483, 503 (1988) (finding that 
felony defendants’ evaluations of their treatment in court “do not appear to depend exclusively upon the 
favorability of their sentences,” but are also “substantially influenced” by “their sense of fairness—in 
terms of both procedural and distributive justice”). But see JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (presenting an instrumental view that 
litigants’ concern about procedural justice is related to their preoccupation about substantive outcomes). 
224 Emily Ryo, Deciding to Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration, 78 AM. SOC. 
REV. 574 (2013) (finding that immigrants’ perceptions of procedural justice are significantly related to 
their beliefs regarding the legitimacy of immigration enforcement practices). 
225 See generally David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential 
Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45, 67 (1981) 
(demonstrating that beliefs about outcomes can flourish even though empirical support does not exist). 
226 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (based on the National Sample).  
227 Id. It is important to remember, however, that the overall chance of success in detained removal 
cases is dismal. Over 90% of respondents in both the National Sample and Active Base City Sample 
were removed or required to voluntarily depart. See supra Figure 10. 
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to the judge, it’s a disaster. So what ends up happening is you can’t submit 
those documents that might help your case. You go in front of the judge. The 
judge has a docket to keep on . . . so the judge says, “I’m sorry, they’re late, 
you can’t submit those documents.” You get deported.228 
A second reason why televideo cases may exhibit depressed 
engagement patterns is the increased complexity of litigating over a screen. 
Detainees and their attorneys who experience these practical barriers in the 
early stages of their cases may be deterred from mounting a vigorous 
defense to removal.229 Furthermore, the mechanics of adjudicating over 
video are also challenging for judges, who are charged with ensuring that 
unrepresented litigants understand their rights in the deportation process. 
By definition, all detained immigrants who litigate claims must do so 
while locked in a jail or detention facility. This reality creates difficulties 
for all detainees,230 but also unique difficulties for those detainees assigned 
to televideo courtrooms. Detainees who are brought to court can at least file 
an application for relief when they arrive at court and hand a copy to the 
prosecutor, as is the standard practice among immigration attorneys. They 
can also use courtroom time to confer with their attorneys and sign any 
required paperwork. In contrast, with video, pro se respondents must mail 
their applications in advance of the hearing. Similarly, televideo 
respondents represented by counsel must sign their paperwork and provide 
any documentary proof to their attorneys in advance of their hearings. 
This requirement of advanced preparation may exert downward 
pressure on claimmaking. For pro se litigants, the advanced-filing 
requirement can be bewildering. The requirement also raises several 
important process questions. For example, do the detention centers provide 
pro se video litigants with adequate information in a language they can 
understand regarding how to mail their applications to the judge and 
prosecutor?231 Do detainees’ materials consistently make their way through 
 
228 Telephone Interview #18, supra note 173. 
229 As Lucie White has identified in the context of welfare hearings, “procedural rituals” that 
undermine access to “meaningful participation” are revealed “when subordinated speakers attempt to 
use the procedures that the system affords them.” Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival 
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990). 
230 The various challenges facing all detainees have become more apparent as of late with increased 
media attention on the recent influx of women and children seeking refuge in the United States. For a 
collection of powerful testimonies of volunteer attorneys documenting due process concerns with the 
handling of detained cases in Artesia, New Mexico, see Stephen Manning’s Videos, VIMEO, http:// 
vimeo.com/user24137058/videos [http://perma.cc/8TZR-PBTM]. 
231 Only in the Newark court did I observe respondents receiving a handout (titled “Mailing 
Addresses for Immigration Judge and Prosecutor”) that contained the relevant information. In other 
remote locations, respondents were left to wonder where to mail their finished applications. At Karnes, 
I learned from an interviewee that a detainee contacted him because the address he was given by his 
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the prison mail system to the judge’s desk on time?232 Would judges refuse 
additional extension requests by video respondents who encountered 
logistical challenges in meeting the court’s filing deadline?233 
The advanced preparation that video demands also challenges 
immigration attorneys. The overwhelming majority of attorneys practicing 
in detained immigration courts are solo practitioners or small firm 
lawyers.234 To maintain their practices, they generally must accept high 
volumes of cases and charge a low, fixed amount per case.235 With such 
demands on their time, these attorneys often depend on meeting their 
clients at the hearing to update them on the status of their cases and to 
finalize their paperwork. Detainees brought to in-person courtrooms can 
meet with their attorneys in the court’s lock-up prior to the hearing. In 
addition, they can confer with their attorneys in the courtroom prior to the 
judge taking the bench, or quietly during and after the hearing.236 Video’s 
elimination of this valuable in-person time with clients may result in the 
waiver of some claims. 
Remote adjudication could also dampen claim-seeking behavior and 
reduce attorney involvement due to the additional travel and preparation 
time required to effectively counsel clients who appear over a video screen. 
With televideo technology, attorneys must visit their clients at the remote 
detention location before and after every hearing.237 Attorneys handling 
televideo cases reported traveling hours to remote locations and enduring 
 
counselor to mail the application was wrong. He received his application “return to sender” after the 
due date. 
232 The Board of Immigration Appeals has refused to accept the prison mailbox rule, which means 
that even if a detainee mails an application in a timely fashion, the judge may treat it as untimely based 
on when EOIR receives it. J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (B.I.A. 1997). 
233 The data presented earlier in this Article reveal that televideo cases are faster than in-person 
cases and also less likely to include continuances to seek counsel or prepare for trial. See supra Figure 7 
& notes 143–44. 
234 See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 21, at 27 n.111 (finding that 88% of attorney representation in 
detained immigration courts is provided by solo practitioners or attorneys practicing in small firms with 
ten or fewer lawyers). 
235 Interview #30, supra note 174 (describing “immigration defense” as a “volume business”). 
236 See, e.g., Telephone Interview #25, supra note 117 (explaining that after a complex and 
emotional hearing, her video client was “confused,” but “[h]ad she been with me, we could have talked 
and kind of defused the situation and I could have made her feel a little better”). 
237 See, e.g., Telephone Interview #36 with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Oct. 9, 2013) (on file 
with author) (“I go to [the detention center] almost once a week because of the televideo. I mean, just to 
be honest with you, it sucks for me because I have to drive two hours. . . . I’ve got to tell [my clients] 
what happened in court because I don’t want to have one-on-one conversations with them [over the 
video] in front of the judge and the government attorney. So I go there.”); Telephone Interview #32 
with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Sept. 20, 2013) (on file with author) (explaining that the process of 
driving to the remote location and waiting to meet the client to communicate a routine matter can take 
hours: “[I]t sounds horrible to say, but you’ve wasted your entire day for about a ten to fifteen minute 
conversation with one respondent . . . .”). 
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long wait times for private meeting rooms, often to only secure a signature 
on a document or communicate what happened in court.238 Preparation for 
trial is also more time-intensive in video cases. Because attorneys are not 
able to answer questions and otherwise guide their clients during video 
hearings, they must spend additional time in preparation sessions with their 
clients at detention centers.239 Given the relatively low fees that are earned 
for detained work, taking on video cases becomes cost prohibitive for some 
attorneys. These supply-side factors could contribute to the reduced 
representation rate in televideo courtrooms. 
This Article’s finding of less attorney involvement in televideo cases 
is notable given the speculation of technology enthusiasts that the 
technique would encourage legal representation.240 Supporters have 
theorized that televideo should increase attorney representation because it 
allows attorneys to appear in downtown courtrooms near their offices 
rather than traveling to remote courtrooms.241 However, the missing link in 
this logic is that attorneys must travel to consult with their remote clients—
often many more times than is necessary for in-person adjudication. 
Proposals to expand televideo services to allow for video client 
consultation have been made,242 but further research is needed to determine 
whether this addition might exacerbate respondent alienation from the 
process. 
Judges also struggle with the strained mechanics of litigation over a 
screen. For example, the judge must ensure that the respondent has 
received the charging document. In the traditional courtroom, documents 
can be physically handed over to the immigrant. Over video, the same 
exchange is often confused and chaotic. As one judge complained: “If I’m 
trying to show people their Notice to Appear . . . [I] have to go up to the 
camera and show it to them. That’s just awkward.”243 Although it is 
 
238 See, e.g., Interview #28 with Dir., Nonprofit Org. (Sept. 16, 2013) (on file with author) 
(describing frustrations with securing attorney visits at detention centers: “I’ve waited until six o’clock 
at night—from nine o’clock in the morning until six o’clock—and not been able to see my clients [at 
the detention center]”). 
239 See, e.g., Interview #10 with Managing Attorney, Nonprofit Org. (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with 
author) (“I went out there because I knew that [the trial] was going to be over video . . . I spent the 
whole entire day with him in the jail the day before, practicing and preparing. So there are other things 
you have to do to compensate [for video]. But if you have a client who is going to be there in person, 
you can take some shortcuts in your prep that you can’t take with the video . . . .”). 
240 See supra note 10. 
241 See IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK, supra note 10. 
242 See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, DRAFT, ACUS PILOT PROJECT ON REMOTE 
REPRESENTATION FOR DETAINED IMMIGRATION COURT RESPONDENTS (on file with author). 
243 Interview #29, supra note 118. Attorneys described similar technical difficulties with the 
transmission of documents during court hearings. See, e.g., Telephone Interview #33 with Senior 
Attorney, Small Size-Law Firm (Sept. 24, 2013) (on file with author) (“So it is really hard sometimes 
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possible to fax documents to the remote location, this procedure is time 
consuming and requires involvement of detention staff in the transmission 
of court documents.244 Another judge stressed that having “personal 
interaction” with respondents “makes a difference” with respect to “the 
seamlessness, the ease with which people interact with each other, the ease 
with which issues can be resolved, [and] the informality that can be 
beneficial sometimes to just have a conversation in person in a 
courtroom.”245 These valuable personal interactions between the judge and 
the litigant are lost when the proceeding takes place over screens. 
The mechanics of advising detainees of their rights may also be 
hampered by the video medium. As described in Part I, at the initial master 
calendar hearing, judges advise respondents of their rights, including the 
right to retain an attorney and the right to seek relief.246 Frequently such 
advisals are read simultaneously to large groups of respondents.247 All too 
often, as I observed in both televideo and in-person courtrooms, detained 
immigrants conceded the charges and waived the right to seek relief in a 
matter of minutes. Yet, the reality of hearing one’s rights declared over a 
grainy television may exacerbate this tendency to waive rights, particularly 
if the judge behaves in a way that is less encouraging over video, or is 
perceived as such by the litigants. As one attorney explained: 
It just gets lost when you’ve got a group of pro se [respondents] that are 
getting a group advisal [of rights over video] because of the fact that it’s such 
a large group and there’s no interaction with each individual. . . . Pro se 
[respondents] in a video setting? I think [it] is a disaster.248 
These deficits in the reading of crucial rights advisals over video could also 
contribute to the increased waiver of rights observed in televideo courts. 
 
when you are offering evidence and you want the respondent to authenticate it, you cannot show him 
the document because he’s on the other side. . . . It’s not the same as actual presence.”). 
244 Interviewees also questioned the reliability of the fax equipment. Telephone Interview #25, 
supra note 117 (“You know, they always talk about the ability to fax and I’ve never had that 
successfully work.”). 
245 Interview #37 with Representative, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges (Oct. 16, 2013) (on file 
with author).  
246 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
247 Judicial styles for inquiring into potential avenues for removal varied. Some judges seemed to 
review a thorough checklist with each respondent, explaining in court that the purpose of such questions 
was to see if the respondent could stay in the country. Other judges conducted a more cursory review, 
seemingly based on the documents in the court file, without soliciting answers directly from the 
respondents. 
248 Telephone Interview #18, supra note 173. Another attorney explained that pro se video 
respondents are “bewildered” and often tell the judges they understand, even though “they have no idea 
what happened.” Telephone Interview #25, supra note 117. 
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Although lawyers’ groups and advocacy organizations have expressed 
the idea that exclusion from the trial is the most problematic aspect of 
televideo adjudication, physical exclusion from earlier stages in the process 
may be just as crucial. It is at these early stages when rights are explained 
and waived, applications are filed, and attorneys are retained. As the next 
Section develops, the physical barrier constructed by video not only injects 
logistical challenges into the litigation process, but it also separates the 
respondent from the other courtroom actors in ways that matter. 
3. Disruption of the Courtroom Workgroup. 
[W]hen they used to have detainees brought here, it was a different thing. . . . 
They would come into my courtroom and . . . they would watch other people 
have their hearings. So, then they would see the lawyers come in and then 
they would maybe get the card of the lawyers or they would see maybe who 
was a good lawyer, who was a bad lawyer. . . . Or maybe some lawyer would 
[say] . . . “I’m going to represent this guy.” . . . [T]he dynamic changes 
when . . . you just have somebody who’s in what looks to me like a little 
cloakroom at the jail. . . . I don’t know what they really see on the camera, you 
know, but I’m just going to tell you that they’re not learning about how other 
people are having their hearings . . . .249 
Over thirty years ago, James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob found that 
personal interaction occurring in lower level courts fosters collaborative 
“workgroups” that resolve cases.250 Courts, according to Eisenstein and 
Jacob, are not assembly-line bureaucracies, but rather they are 
organizations that rely on group activity from multiple courtroom 
participants, many of whom work together on a regular basis to resolve 
cases.251 These workgroups in criminal cases include judges, court clerks, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants.252 
It is similarly helpful to think of the various players in immigration 
courtrooms as a functioning workgroup. The judge and prosecutor often 
share the courtroom for much of the day and private immigration attorneys 
frequently handle multiple detained cases in the same court call. Some 
nonprofit organizations focus exclusively on representation in one local 
area, before only a few immigration judges and prosecutors. As one 
practicing immigration attorney explained, immigration court is “intimate,” 
requiring “dealing very closely with the same judges and prosecutors.”253 
 
249 Interview #47, supra note 60. 
250 See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977). 
251 Id. at 9–10. 
252 Id. at 10. 
253 See, e.g., Telephone Interview #21, supra note 117. 
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The players in immigration court know one another and work cooperatively 
and informally to determine the outcome of their cases.254 
Physical removal from the courtroom causes televideo respondents to 
miss most of the informal give-and-take of immigration court. By only 
allowing them a partial televised view, remote litigants are not able to learn 
from—or fully participate in—the various courtroom conversations. This 
disruption of the respondent’s relationship vis-à-vis the other court actors 
may contribute to the depressed levels of claimmaking and representation 
in the video population. 
When attending immigration court, I observed that much of what 
happens within the courtroom is not recorded as part of the official trial 
record.255 Before the judge takes the bench, the prosecutor often discusses 
bond amounts and case resolutions with the attorneys in the courtroom. 
Even after the judge takes the bench, immigration court is a casual affair, 
with judges asking the parties about aspects of case resolution before going 
“on the record.” 
The full complexity of the courtroom cannot be appreciated from the 
remote vantage point. Sometimes these informal assessments of the case 
and its status proceed before the video connection is even established.256 
Other times, they go on while the camera is rolling, but are not captured on 
the remote television screen due to the limited gaze of the court’s camera. 
Off-the-record conversations also occur during disruptions in the video 
feed, such as when the image freezes or the line is disconnected. Without 
the ability to learn from the entire court proceeding, respondents may not 
fully understand the process and therefore may be less likely to participate 
in it. Judge behavior, by failing to accommodate remote litigants’ 
participation in these informal stages of the litigation, may also be 
responsible for the observed decrease in litigant participation. 
As the experienced immigration judge explained in the quote that 
began this Section, immigrants in remote courtrooms are also denied the 
opportunity to participate in the courtroom audience and learn by observing 
the hearings of other immigrants.257 Because they are not physically present 
 
254 Id. (explaining that the other courtroom players “know who I am. They’re generally very 
cooperative . . . it’s informal.”). 
255 Although regulations do require removal hearings to be recorded, statements may be made “off 
the record” with the permission of an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.9 (2015). 
256 IMMIGRATION COURT OBSERVATION PROJECT, NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS: A REPORT ON THE DUE PROCESS CRISIS IN NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRATION COURTS 13 
(2011) [hereinafter ICOP REPORT], available at http://nycicop.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/icop-
report-5-10-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/KQ9Y-FV6G] (“[S]ignificant portions of potentially outcome 
determinative aspects of immigration proceedings frequently take place off the record.”). 
257 Interview #47, supra note 60. 
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in court, they cannot observe the court process or the role of an advocate 
within that process. They may be less likely to meet other litigants who are 
bringing claims, see a judge take seriously the merits of another detainee’s 
claim, or be handed a business card by an attorney willing to take their 
case.258 
Physical presence in court also provides the opportunity to come face-
to-face with the prosecutor. In this moment of growing attention to 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration,259 the ability to confer with the 
prosecutor regarding a potential application for relief may be connected to 
whether relief is actually pursued.260 At times, judges I observed promoted 
such courtroom negotiations between the parties, most commonly with 
respect to bond amounts, filing dates, or whether certain legal requirements 
of relief applications were satisfied.261 In sharp contrast, detained litigants 
appearing by video were flatly denied these in-person opportunities for 
prosecutorial interaction, and no video substitute was offered. 
Crucial differences in lawyer–client interactions were also apparent in 
video courtrooms.262 With televideo, attorneys had no opportunity to offer 
their clients a confidential consultation before, during, or after the hearing. 
Occasionally, courtrooms I observed did allow counsel to talk to the client 
over the video screen, but this option occurred in the middle of the public 
proceeding, offering no confidentiality for the client. Even if the courtroom 
was cleared, confidentiality concerns persisted because the client remained 
 
258 In his classic study of debtors, Herbert Jacob found that contact with someone who had gone 
through the bankruptcy process was an important predictor of asserting a claim of bankruptcy. 
HERBERT JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT (1969). 
259 Jason Cade has persuasively argued that “ICE prosecutors do have certain concrete 
responsibilities,” including to “exercise equitable discretion in appropriate cases.” Jason A. Cade, The 
Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014). 
260 For reasons discussed earlier, I am not suggesting that such interaction currently results in 
meaningful exercise of prosecutorial discretion in detained cases. See supra note 189 (reporting that in 
2012, only fifty prosecutorial discretion terminations or case closures involved detained cases). Rather, 
my point is that the ability to engage in conversations with prosecutors in court may enhance the 
perceived fairness of the process, and therefore the willingness of immigrant respondents to participate 
in the system.  
261 If the immigration courts were to adopt recommendations urged by scholars and advocacy 
groups to formally require pretrial conferences, these litigant–prosecutor interactions could become 
more central to removal adjudication. See, e.g., Cade, supra note 259, at 75 (arguing that “respondents 
in immigration court should have the opportunity to confer with knowledgeable, accountable trial 
attorneys before any hearing on the merits”). The emergence of alternative forms of immigration status 
short of lawful permanent resident status, such as deferred action, parole, or administrative closure, may 
also make plea bargaining more prominent in immigration courts. See Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of 
Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115 (2015). 
262 For an overview of the potential effects of videoconferencing on the attorney–client 
relationship, see Eric T. Bellone, Private Attorney–Client Communications and the Effect of 
Videoconferencing in the Courtroom, 8 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 24 (2013). 
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supervised by jail staff at the remote video location. And, as one law firm 
partner added: 
Why do I hate it? Because if I need to take a recess with my client, my client 
remains on-screen. You hear right through the walls. The judge goes back in 
the chambers. The judge hears everything you say. . . . There is no 
confidentiality to break with your client who is on a screen.263 
Attorneys frequently described the downfall of video hearings as the 
inability of their clients to participate in the full range of courtroom 
exchanges.264 One attorney complained that televideo “doesn’t engage the 
client or involve the client in his own case . . . even when they have a 
lawyer.”265 In the courtroom, particularly at early stages in the case, what 
happens may not be understood as a “big deal.”266 But, the respondent 
“misses all those dynamics” of what goes on in the courtroom.267 For 
example, represented video litigants may not “feel as assured that their 
lawyers are doing what they said they were going to do when it is all so 
distant,” thus contributing to the waiver of potential claims.268 One attorney 
poignantly analogized the treatment of immigrants kept outside the 
courtroom under the televideo regime to the antiquated practice of 
execution by firing squad: “[I]f [my client is] on the videoconference, it’s 
almost like he’s on the firing squad—or at the other end of a firing squad I 
should say.”269 
Despite these challenges, attorneys remained unlikely to join their 
clients at the remote end of the proceeding. As one small firm attorney 
explained: 
 
263 Interview #14, supra note 60; see also Interview #16, supra note 174 (“It’s this interesting sort 
of fiction because you’re supposed to have this confidential situation [if you ask for the courtroom to be 
cleared], but in the immigration courtroom . . . there are three doors and . . . the trial attorney, the 
guards, and the judge are all right behind those doors. So there’s really not a lot of privacy.”). 
264 Video thus intensifies the problematic traditional division between lawyer and client roles that 
detracts from client autonomy. See generally SUSAN M. OLSEN, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING 
THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS 140 (1984) (“[N]orms of legal advocacy inhibit client autonomy 
and responsibility by imposing the authority of a supposedly neutral expert on the client . . . .”); Gerald 
P. López, An Aversion to Clients: Loving Humanity and Hating Human Beings, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 315, 316 (1996) (stressing that lawyers “need to include clients, to reach out to clients, to pay 
attention to clients, to learn from clients”). 
265 Interview #16, supra note 174. 
266 Id.  
267 Id.  
268 Id.  
269 Interview #13 with Partner, Small-Size Law Firm (Aug. 6, 2013) (on file with author). 
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You have to take multiple cases for it to be lucrative, if you will. So it’s hard 
if I would have to physically drive to every single facility [to appear with my 
clients remotely]. All in the morning? It would be impossible.270 
Most attorneys I interviewed shared the view that being physically present 
in the courtroom with the judge was preferable to appearing at the remote 
location with the client—it was less likely to alienate the judge and allowed 
the attorney to participate in off-the-record discussions with the prosecutor 
and the judge. 
The reduction in interaction between the televised respondent and the 
other courtroom players was striking. At the formal courtroom end of the 
hearing, the detainee appearing on the screen was only treated as a 
participant in the proceeding when directly asked questions by the judge or 
by counsel while testifying. At other times during the hearings, the 
courtroom players generally did not look at or engage with the video 
screen.271 A Chicago attorney described how one judge interacted with his 
client appearing on a television screen: 
The person is on the screen and [the judge] just never would address the 
respondent. And to the point where he would ask the respondent questions and 
just not look up when the respondent would talk. And I have always thought 
like that’s at least partially related to the fact that the respondent isn’t in the 
room.272 
At the video end of the hearing, often the respondent could not see her 
attorney or the prosecutor on the screen. At one remote hearing I attended 
in Karnes City, Texas, the focal point of the video feed was the back of the 
judge’s computer screen—punctuated when he would lean forward to sip a 
Coke or address questions directly to the detainee. Some judges did offer 
the respondent a full view of the courtroom, but when that arrangement was 
pursued, the images at the remote location were so small that often it was 
hard to detect whether the person talking was the judge, prosecutor, or 
respondent’s counsel. 
When I visited the remote location at the county jail in Kenosha, 
Wisconsin, respondents’ counsel in the Chicago courtroom were given the 
opportunity to briefly greet their clients over the television screen. During 
the hearing, however, I could not see the respondents’ attorneys on the 
 
270 Interview #30, supra note 174. 
271 In this way, televideo is one very poignant example of what Alexandra Natapoff has described 
in the criminal justice system: treating the very target of the government’s charge as a “disfavored 
speaker[] outside the legal process.” Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal 
Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2005). 
272 Interview #8, supra note 117. 
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television screen. The attorney role within the proceeding was rendered 
audible, yet invisible, to their clients. As one attorney described: 
During direct exam, during cross-exam, the [televideo] respondent hears 
respondent’s counsel or DHS counsel asking questions but cannot see them. 
So that causes a big disconnect, I think, for respondents. They think it’s their 
attorney talking, they think it’s the government attorney talking but they don’t 
know what they look like. Especially if it is government counsel and they’re 
making faces, getting upset at the respondents, [the video litigants are] just 
depending on hearing their voice. So it just creates a disconnect, I think—like 
the respondents can’t really feel like they’re fully participating in it.273 
A community member who volunteered to observe detained court 
proceedings on behalf of a nonprofit organization also lamented the limited 
view of the remote video screen: 
I feel it’s unfortunate that they can’t see their lawyer. All they see is the judge 
and the interpreter in front of them, and I think it’s very important [to see the 
lawyer] for body language and reinforcement. Encouragement—they don’t get 
that. They hear their lawyer and that’s all, and I think that’s a real difficult 
problem. That is something that’s missing.274 
Technical problems in the video connection further accentuated the 
separation of the respondent from the courtroom. These “technical 
problems,” as one judge described, included “them being able to hear us, us 
being able to hear them, and also them being able to see us, us being able to 
see them, even being connected at all.”275 Attorneys I interviewed 
frequently complained about awkward delays in the transmission of the 
video feed, blackouts in the video screen, and difficulties understanding 
courtroom interpreters.276 As another judge explained, the worst part about 
using video is that it “breaks down” and “that’s what interferes with the 
hearing.”277 Such breakdowns caused all parties considerable frustration 
and interrupted the flow of the proceedings. 
In summary, court observations and interviews document disruptions 
in the televideo respondents’ engagement with the courtroom workgroup. 
 
273 Interview #9 with Supervising Attorney, Nonprofit Org. (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with author). 
274 Interview #12 with Court Watch Volunteer, Nonprofit Org. (Aug. 6, 2013) (on file with author). 
275 Interview #29, supra note 118. 
276 See, e.g., Telephone Interview #21, supra note 117 (“[S]ometimes the video goes out or you 
can’t hear them. Or I’ve seen cases which I think are the worst where the translator is on speakerphone 
and [the respondent is] on video, and it’s hard to understand what’s happening.”); Telephone Interview 
#25, supra note 117 (“[T]he reliability of the equipment is always an issue.”); Telephone Interview #26, 
supra note 210 (describing numerous technical difficulties, including a “three-second delay” in the 
video feed and “a lot of problems with the video going black”); Telephone Interview #27, supra note 87 
(“Yes, I’ve had cases before where using technology, you know, it messes up at times; it doesn’t 
cooperate.”). 
277 Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1. 
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Respondents do not learn from other cases, cannot appreciate or participate 
in many aspects of their own case, are denied opportunities to meet face-to-
face with the prosecutor, and have lower quality interactions with their own 
lawyers. These challenges could contribute to the depressed video 
engagement observed in the immigration court data. A related aspect of this 
disruption, as discussed in the next Section, is physical separation from the 
courtroom audience. 
4. Separation from the Courtroom Audience. 
I think the video is really difficult for families when they come. . . . 
[S]ometimes, you know, they say [to the respondent], “You can speak with 
your family, they’re sitting there.” They feel so awkward standing in front of 
the microphone. They’re not used to a microphone. You can see their body 
language. What do I do? And they don’t feel comfortable saying—you 
know—they know everybody is watching them. They’re standing there in 
front of this microphone trying to talk to this loved one that’s in the screen and 
there’s no body contact . . . .278 
A final practical consequence of remote adjudication is its impact on 
the relationship between the courtroom audience and the immigrant 
respondent. Federal courts have consistently held that public access to 
immigration courts remains “a fundamental principle of fair play inherent 
in our judicial process [and] cannot be seriously challenged.”279 With few 
exceptions, the standard of public access applies to all immigration 
hearings,280 including those conducted in detained settings and via 
videoconference technology.281 According to the rules, no prior notification 
is needed to observe an open immigration hearing in a federal immigration 
court.282 
Establishment of video hearing locations at jails and prisons means 
that court proceedings are conducted simultaneously at two locations. One 
is the hearing location with the judge, prosecutor, respondent’s counsel, 
 
278 Interview #12, supra note 274. 
279 Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 119–20 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[I]t is well established that a[n] 
[immigration] judge may take only the most limited action necessary to sufficiently protect the interest 
perceived to be paramount to the interest of the public in an open hearing.”). 
280 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2015). One important exception to the general rule of open immigration 
proceedings is for asylum merits hearings, which may be closed if the applicant makes an “express” 
request. Id. § 1240.11(c)(3)(i). 
281 Exec. Office for Immigration Review, About the Court, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/was/HQIC.htm [http://perma.cc/7GZP-BDWE] (“Public access to VTC 
hearings is governed by the provisions of 8 C.F.R. 1003.27 in the same manner as onsite in-person 
hearings.”). 
282 Exec. Office for Immigration Review, Observing Immigration Court Hearings, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/ObservingImmigrationHearings
09092010.htm [http://perma.cc/LL7L-8XLE]. 
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and court staff.283 The second is the remote hearing location with the 
respondent and correctional staff. Although both sites are technically 
operating as courts and therefore should be open to the public, there are 
numerous practical barriers to public attendance at remote hearing 
locations. 
Barriers I encountered scheduling visits to remote video courtrooms 
for my own research illustrate this point. To observe a video hearing 
location, I was required to follow the specific entry requirements prescribed 
by federal detention standards284 as well as those of the government or 
subcontracting private facility housing the detainee.285 This procedure 
demanded careful coordination with Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) officials (who supervise the detention facilities) and the 
wardens (who run the facilities). Access was further complicated by the 
absence of immigration court staff at the remote video hearing location. As 
a result, I often had to involve immigration court officials in Washington, 
D.C. to explain to the various law enforcement authorities that detention-
based video hearing locations are in fact courtrooms to which public access 
should be granted without any need for advance permission. As a 
representative of EOIR explained via email to an ICE field office official in 
preparation for my visit: 
So you are aware, EOIR does not require visitors to the immigration courts to 
be granted permission to observe open hearings. . . . EOIR does not require 
notice to observe a hearing. Rather, we advise interested parties that they 
should contact the detention facility in advance to assist ICE in its security 
clearance protocols.286 
From the perspective of jail and detention officials, who often did not 
perceive that they were operating public courts, granting my access to the 
video appearance rooms was a burden. Although I was eventually able to 
enter several remote locations and attend the video end of proceedings, at 
one of the nation’s largest detention facilities in Conroe, Texas, officials 
 
283 For the rare exception to this setup, such as having the attorney or interpreter at the remote 
location, see supra note 63. 
284 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL 
DETENTION STANDARDS § 5.7, at 367 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-
standards/2011/pbnds2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/8F5Z-5RE9]. 
285 See, e.g., ESSEX CNTY. DEP’T OF CORR. TRAINING BUREAU, IDENTIFICATION CARD ISSUANCE 
FORM—CIVILIAN (on file with author) (requiring identity information to secure advanced clearance to 
access facility). 
286 E-mail from Kathryn Mattingly, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to James K. Bond, 
Assistant Field Office Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Chi. Field Office (July 18, 
2013, 10:10 PST) (on file with author). 
EAGLY (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2015 4:42 PM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
996 
explained that they simply could not accommodate a member of the public 
at the remote video hearing. As I was informed by email: 
In this instance the hearings are open to the public and you are more than 
welcome to observe the hearings, we simply ask that you do so at the [in-
person courtroom at] Houston CDF where facilities and staff are in place to 
accommodate access to the general public. We would love to have 
immigration judges and attorneys located in the Joe Corley Facility to conduct 
hearings in person and, if that is ever the case, those hearings would most 
certainly be open to the public at the Joe Corley Facility.287 
In other words, according to detention officials in Conroe, only one end of 
the video proceeding was appropriate for the public—that where the judge 
was physically located in downtown Houston. The makeshift video courts 
at the detained location in the Joe Corley Facility simply did not have the 
space or staff to accommodate a public audience.288 
Attorneys I interviewed recounted similar struggles with not being 
allowed to attend video hearings from the remote location due to a stated 
inability to accommodate the public in a locked facility. This was true even 
though they were seeking access to represent their own clients from the 
remote location.289 In addition, some attorneys were prevented from 
attending the remote courtroom by ad hoc judge policies that required 
attorney presence in the traditional courtroom.290 
Access for families and community members was even more 
challenging. They may be denied access because officials do not treat the 
remote location as a court. Or, they may be excluded based on the facility’s 
peculiar regulations, such as rules barring individuals with criminal records 
or requiring a certain style of attire. As one judge I interviewed 
acknowledged, “it is definitely more difficult for . . . families and anybody 
 
287 E-mail from Bret Bradford, Assistant Field Office Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, Hous. Field Office, to author (Sept. 30, 2013, 09:57 PST) (on file with author). 
288 There are important parallels between the isolation of these detained respondents and the 
broader system of social control fostered by mass incarceration. See generally Gerald P. López, How 
Mainstream Reformers Design Ambitious Reentry Programs Doomed to Fail and Destined to Reinforce 
Targeted Mass Incarceration and Social Control, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1 (2014) 
(highlighting the failure of reentry programs in an era of mass incarceration). 
289 Telephone Interview #49 with Detention Attorney, Nonprofit Org. (Jan. 10, 2014) (on file with 
author) (“You can’t physically sever an attorney from her client all the time. I launched this whole 
campaign to use the VTC room.”). Others have complained of similar problems in gaining access to 
video courtrooms. See, e.g., CHICAGO STUDY, supra note 42, at 58 (noting that “ICE relies on lack of 
space” at Chicago’s remote court location “as grounds for excluding the public from the remote site”). 
290 See, e.g., Telephone Interview #34 with Clinical Assistant Professor, Immigration Clinic, ABA-
Approved Law Sch. (Sept. 26, 2013) (on file with author) (explaining that some courts “want you with 
the judge” during a video hearing, rather than at the remote location). 
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to come to those [video] hearings because they have to go through the extra 
security measures that are present for a prison or a detention facility.”291 
Audience exclusion also can occur in traditional immigration courts,292 
but the severe barriers to accessing remote video courtrooms rise to the 
level of a de facto bar on audience presence in the same physical space as 
the televideo respondent. The end result is that video detainees attend their 
hearings alone. In fact, at many video locations, I was the first member of 
the public ever to attend. At one hearing, the judge was so alarmed when 
the remote prosecutor alerted him that someone from the public was 
actually observing a remote hearing that he interrupted the proceeding to 
ask what I was doing. At another remote location, I heard the judge 
laughing over the screen, calling the immigrants held in Huntsville, Texas, 
“my little prisoners,” clearly not acting like someone who understood he 
might have a public audience (I was not visible to him on the screen). 
The creation of a remote courtroom devoid of an audience threatens 
the very foundations of what Judith Resnick and Dennis Curtis have called 
“democratic courtrooms”—public space intended to facilitate “millions of 
exchanges” between litigants, audiences, and judges.293 Omission of the 
audience interrupts these important connections between members of the 
public and the very institutions that make profound judgments about their 
communities. This exclusion of “friends, family, and community members” 
from the courts is a problem Jocelyn Simonson has convincingly shown is 
all too common in modern criminal courts, where trial by a jury of one’s 
peers has been replaced by a system of mass plea bargaining.294 This 
removal of the public from the everyday realities of lower level courts 
isolates the judicial system from the imperative of public accountability 
and disempowers low-income communities and communities of color that 
are most directly affected by the court system.295 The lack of an audience 
composed of family and friends may also contribute to the phenomenon 
observed in this Article—less vigorous involvement in the court process by 
the litigants themselves. 
 
291 Interview #37, supra note 245. 
292 For example, Northwestern University political scientist Jacqueline Stevens alleges she was 
excluded without cause from an immigration court hearing in Atlanta, Georgia. See Stevens v. Holder, 
950 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285 (N.D. Ga. 2013). 
293 JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND 
RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 306–37 (2011). 
294 Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2173, 2177 (2014) (“Rather than welcoming the public into courthouses, court administrators around 
the country often exclude audiences from nontrial courtrooms . . . .”). 
295 RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 293, at 308. Simonson argues that interference with the public’s 
participation in criminal courtrooms also violates the Sixth and First Amendments. Simonson, supra 
note 294, at 2176. 
EAGLY (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2015 4:42 PM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
998 
Recognizing the chasm caused by immigration courts devoid of juries 
or any audience participation, community members in several major cities 
have begun “court watch” programs that organize and train volunteers to 
observe immigration hearings.296 These programs, as I learned during my 
interviews, reflect the idea that the very act of observing the court can 
enhance the overall fairness of the proceedings.297 As one volunteer 
described, her goal in attending court every week is “simply to make these 
people more visible and to have the court personnel know that people are 
concerned about what happens to these detainees.”298 By documenting what 
happens in court, an active court watch program can ensure that the public 
“always has a presence in all those courtrooms” and can “get [out] the word 
about what is happening to individual people.”299 
Although court watch programs help to reinstitute the immigration 
courtroom audience, no such program has ever been established at the 
remote end of a video hearing. When volunteers observe video hearings, 
they must sit with the judge in the courtroom end of the proceeding. 
However, the physical setup of the in-person end of the televideo 
courtroom—with a single video screen facing the judge rather than the 
audience—suggests that public court observation is not anticipated or 
encouraged. One immigration attorney I interviewed lamented: 
I think that televideo depersonalizes the whole process. . . . [T]he way the TV 
screen is set up, anyone who is sitting in the courtroom [audience] can’t see 
the screen. . . . The screen is set up to point toward the judge and so people 
who are there don’t see the person on the screen.300 
In the initial Chicago televideo pilot program, two television screens 
were used. One screen faced the judge and the second screen faced the 
 
296 ICOP REPORT, supra note 256, at 25–27 (explaining how to start an immigration court 
observation program). To date, several cities have established such programs, including Chicago, New 
York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. See About, CHI. COURTWATCH, http://chicagocourtwatch.
wordpress.com/about/ [http://perma.cc/75T5-LPBJ]; IMMIGR. CT. OBSERVATION PROJECT, https://
nycicop.wordpress.com [http://perma.cc/5U3C-W8M5]; Los Angeles Immigration Court Watch 
Program, TUMBLR (Aug. 26, 2014), http://laimmigrationcourtwatchprogram.tumblr.com [http://perma.
cc/VJE4-X9SE]; S.F. Bay Area Chapter, Immigration Committee, NAT’L LAW. GUILD, http://www.
nlgsf.org/content/immigration-committee [http://perma.cc/KYT2-PKT6]. 
297 A large body of social science research has attempted to measure the effect of observation on 
the behavior of subjects who are aware they are being watched. See generally Jim McCambridge et al., 
Systematic Review of the Hawthorne Effect: New Concepts Are Needed to Study Research Participation 
Effects, 67 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 267 (2014) (summarizing research finding that individuals who 
are aware they are being observed may alter their behavior, known in the literature as the “Hawthorne 
effect”). 
298 Interview #11 with Volunteer Coordinator, Nonprofit Org. (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with author).  
299 Id. 
300 Interview #14, supra note 60. 
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audience.301 This courtroom layout allowed spectators in the courtroom to 
have their own television screen for watching the remote detainees. Yet, 
when videoconferencing was fully implemented in Chicago and other 
cities, the audience’s television screen was conspicuously removed. 
Families attending court could no longer see their detained loved ones.302 
In my own site visits, I usually had to sit toward the front of the 
courtroom and crook my neck forward to observe the video screen. In 
Houston’s detained court, for example, I could view the screen only if I sat 
in the seats reserved for counsel on the right-hand side of the court. In one 
Los Angeles courtroom, I gained a sideways view of the screen by sitting 
in the front row of pews, but audience members in the rows behind me 
stared at the back of the television set. 
The reality is that when family and community members do attempt to 
participate in video hearings, they are always in the courtroom with the 
judge, not with the person they came to support. As described in the quote 
from a court watch volunteer that opened this Section, some judges do 
allow family members to say hello over the video screen. However, in all 
instances that I observed, this greeting was done quickly and awkwardly at 
the end of the hearing, often after the loved one had already been ordered 
deported. At the end of one hearing I watched, an attorney told his client 
appearing on the television: “Your wife and mother came today—just so 
you know.” But, even with these reassuring words transmitted over the 
video screen, the respondent never actually viewed his family in the 
courtroom. As one interviewee described it: 
[T]he [televideo] screen only faced the judge. So, family members who came 
couldn’t see their family member. The respondent couldn’t see if his family 
was there to support him and the court could care less. I mean, the system 
could care less. . . . So how is that public? To me that’s not public.303 
Video thus separates the litigant from the comfort that a courtroom 
audience can provide. If prior social science research is any guide, it would 
be no wonder if family and community members perceive the remote 
courtroom setup as fundamentally unfair.304 This judgment may make 
 
301 CHICAGO STUDY, supra note 42, at 9, 20, 26, 35, 50. 
302 Id. at 26 n.43; see also Interview #16, supra note 174 (explaining that when video was fully 
implemented in Chicago the screen facing the audience was taken away and only the screen facing the 
judge remained). 
303 Interview #16, supra note 174. 
304 See, e.g., Lindsay et al., supra note 195, at 886 (reporting that study participants pretending to 
be a family member of the accused “perceive[d] barriers and closed-circuit television to be threats to the 
fair treatment of the defendant”); Bradley D. McAuliff & Margaret Bull Kovera, Do Jurors Get What 
They Expect? Traditional Versus Alternative Forms of Children’s Testimony, 18 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 
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audience members less likely to assist detainees in retaining an attorney or 
obtaining proof for an affirmative claim. In turn, the respondent placed in a 
system severed from any public accountability may be less likely to 
participate in the adversarial process. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of remote adjudication to decide immigration cases provides a 
unique window for viewing televideo’s practical effects. This Article offers 
cause for celebration—immigration judges may indeed be skilled at 
reaching a fair decision at trial while relying on new courtroom 
technologies. Remote adjudication also offers cause for concern—
immigrants and their attorneys may be adversely affected in the rush to 
make courts move faster. These insights contribute necessary lessons for 
other high-volume court systems that are similarly considering a turn to 
video adjudication. 
This Article’s empirical findings also suggest that the conventional 
critique of procedural innovation is far too narrow. Researchers and 
policymakers have adopted a trial-centered analysis of technology’s import 
to adjudication. Especially in this era of fewer trials, research must begin to 
ask different questions. It must instead focus on the indirect effects on case 
outcomes caused by court practices that foster litigant disengagement, 
particularly among poor, incarcerated, and otherwise vulnerable 
populations. 
To the extent judicial efficiency gains are reaped by new video 
procedures, enthusiasm must be tempered by serious concerns about 
meaningful participation by litigants and their attorneys. By associating 
adverse outcomes in televideo cases with the waiver of rights, this Article 
begins an important new conversation about technology’s potential threat 
to the legitimacy of the adversarial process. It is crucial to continue to 
identify and understand the breakdown in litigant engagement that video 




27, 43 (2012) (finding that study participants acting as mock jurors believed that “traditional testimony 
is the fairest to defendants”). 
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APPENDIX 
The immigration court data analyzed in this Article were originally 
collected by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the 
Justice Department division responsible for administering the nation’s 
court system. They were obtained for academic research with Freedom of 
Information Act requests made by the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University.305 In my capacity as a 
TRAC Fellow, I obtained these data in comma-delimited format and 
transferred them into STATA, a statistical software package that allows for 
data analysis and production of graphics.306 
The complete EOIR database includes 6,165,128 individual 
immigration proceedings that span from fiscal years 1951 to 2013. 
However, the analysis presented in Part II of this Article considers only 
those detained removal cases adjudicated during the two-year period for 
which the most televideo data were available (from 2011 to 2012). 
Before beginning analysis, I first reviewed the EOIR data for 
completeness and accuracy. I performed validity checks by comparing the 
data with EOIR’s annual statistical reporting of the same data.307 I also 
reviewed other publications that analyzed EOIR immigration court data, 
including those by government researchers,308 nonprofit research 
organizations,309 and legal scholars.310 
The Immigration and Nationality Act,311 as well as expository texts 
and practice manuals312 and my own site visits to immigration courts,313 
 
305 For more background on TRAC and its process for gathering public records, see About Us, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.html [http:// 
perma.cc/3TVD-6E9W]. 
306 In completing this review, I worked closely with my research assistant Steven Shafer as well as 
Professor Joseph Doherty, the Director of UCLA’s Empirical Research Group. 
307 Each year, EOIR publishes a lengthy statistical report. See, e.g., 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 
23. 
308 See, e.g., BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 8; GAO REPORT, supra note 128; OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MANAGEMENT OF IMMIGRATION CASES AND APPEALS BY 
THE EXECECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (2012) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL 
REPORT], http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2012/e1301.pdf [http://perma.cc/MUV9-LJEW]. 
309 See, e.g., VERA EVALUATION, supra note 140, at 75 fig.21; Asylum Disparities Persist, 
Regardless of Court Location and Nationality, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 
24, 2007), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/183 [http://perma.cc/Y37X-DG4R]; Donald Kerwin, 
Charitable Legal Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why They Matter and How They Can Be 
Expanded, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 2004, at 1 (written when the author was Executive Director of the 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.). 
310 See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 149; Camp Keith et al., supra note 177. 
311 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537). 
312 See, e.g., DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES 
(2011). 
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provided the overall legal context for the patterns observed in the data. In 
analyzing the coding used in the EOIR database, I also relied on EOIR’s 
publications and internal documents, including data coding lookup tables,314 
data management training manuals,315 court operating policies and 
procedures,316 and judicial training materials.317 
This Appendix summarizes the steps taken in preparing two samples 
of detained removal cases for analysis, the National Sample and the Active 
Base City Sample. 
A. National Sample 
The following steps were taken in order to create a National Sample of 
detained removal cases:318 
Proceeding Type. “Removal proceedings” were by far the most 
common type of immigration proceeding in the EOIR data.319 Deleting 
proceedings not categorized as removal (such as proceedings for rescission 
or under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act320) 
ensured that outcome comparisons of televideo versus in person were for 
 
313 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
314 Through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, TRAC obtained twelve EOIR lookup 
files to facilitate the proper identification of the values in the data. 
315 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CASE TRAINING 
MANUAL (2003) (obtained by author by FOIA Request #2013-15030) (on file with author); EXEC. 
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CASE DATA ENTRY COURSE LESSON PLAN 
(2010) (version 1.3) (obtained by author by FOIA Request #2013-15030) (on file with author); EXEC. 
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CASE HELP DESK FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (2010) (obtained by author by FOIA Request #2014-7182) (on file with author); 
Adjournment Code Memo, supra note 110; UNIFORM DOCKETING MANUAL, supra note 128.  
316 See, e.g., COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 84; EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DIGITAL AUDIO RECORDING USER MANUAL (2012) (obtained by author by 
FOIA Request #2014-7182) (on file with author); Memorandum from the Office of the Chief 
Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Assistant Chief 
Immigration Judges et al., Hearings Conducted Through Telephone and Video Conference (Aug. 18, 
2004) [hereinafter Telephone & Video Conference Hearings Memorandum], available at http://www.
justice.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm04/04-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/M8GT-HX4W].  
317 See, e.g., IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK, supra note 10; CASE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING 
POLICIES, supra note 28; Telephone & Video Conference Hearings Memorandum, supra note 316; 
EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CASE DATA ENTRY COURSE LESSON 
PLAN (2010) (version 1.1) (obtained by author by FOIA Request #2013-15030) (on file with author). 
318 In reporting the number of proceedings or cases removed based on each variable, I include those 
removed due to lack of data for that particular variable. 
319 In 1997, the term “removal” replaced the former terms of “exclusion” and “deportation.” 
Compare 8 C.F.R. § 240.15 (1997) (using the terms “exclusion” and “deportation”), with id. § 240.21 
(2015) (using the term “removal”). 
320 To explain in greater detail, the following proceeding types are not considered removal 
proceedings by EOIR: credible fear, reasonable fear, claimed status, asylum only, rescission, continued 
detention review, Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), exclusion, 
deportation, and withholding. See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at C1–C3 (itemizing the different 
categories of immigration proceedings). 
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the same proceeding type. Of the 6,165,128 proceedings in original 
dataset,321 1,839,628 nonremoval proceedings were deleted, leaving 
4,325,500 removal proceedings.322 
Merits Decisions. The data were next restricted to those cases in which 
the immigration judge reached a decision on the merits. As discussed in 
Part I of this Article, immigration judges make one of four possible merits 
decisions: terminate the case, grant relief, allow voluntary departure, or 
order removal.323 Purely administrative decisions, such as change of venue 
or transfer, are not classified by EOIR as merits decisions.324 Often, 
administrative closures were followed by the opening of a new proceeding 
for the same respondent in which the judge reaches a decision on the merits 
of the case (to terminate, grant relief, allow voluntary departure, or order 
removal).325 
Consistent with other studies of immigration courts, the first on-the-
merits decision was treated as the relevant judicial decision for analysis of 
case outcomes.326 Accordingly, proceedings held subsequent to the first on-
the-merits decision—including reopening of a closed case or remand for a 
new trial after appellate review327—were not analyzed. 
 
321 This number of proceedings represents 4,780,558 unique cases. 
322 This number of proceedings removed represents 3,365,485 unique cases. 
323 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at D1 (“In rendering a decision, the immigration judge may 
order the alien removed from the United States, grant some form of relief, or terminate the 
[case] . . . .”). In its statistical reporting, EOIR classifies decisions to allow voluntary departure as 
removal orders. Id. at Q1. 
324 Id. at D1 (defining the “other” category of proceeding-level completions as those in which an 
immigration judge “does not render a decision on the merits”). A study conducted by ACUS similarly 
drew a distinction between removal proceedings concluded on the merits and those that did not result in 
merits decisions, such as administrative closure, transfer to a different location, or change of venue. 
BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 8, at 15.  
325 The Office of the Inspector General has critiqued EOIR’s practice of using multiple 
administrative closures before reaching a decision on the merits. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra 
note 308, at i (“[A]dministrative events such as changes of venue and transfers are reported as 
completions even though the immigration courts have made no decisions on whether to remove aliens 
from the United States. As a result, a case may be ‘completed’ multiple times.”). 
326 This methodology is consistent with other studies of EOIR data. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra 
note 128, at 65 (explaining that in order to study the merits decision before appellate review, “we 
limited our analysis data set to only those proceedings with records that included the first decision on 
the merits . . . made by an immigration judge”); VERA EVALUATION, supra note 140, at 86 (“[W]e used 
the first decision issued by the immigration judge as the case outcome in this analysis.”).  
327 After an immigration judge orders removal, a respondent generally has the right to appeal to a 
reviewing court, known as the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (2015). 
As immigration scholar Jill Family has documented, a limited number of BIA decisions may be 
appealed to the federal appellate courts. Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration 
Reform: The Certificate of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499 (2008). 
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Following this methodology, a total of 1,396,008 nonmerits 
proceedings were deleted, leaving 2,929,492 cases, each with one relevant 
merits decision for analysis.328 
Fiscal Year. The data were next limited to cases decided in fiscal 
years 2011 and 2012, when televideo adjudication became most active.329 
For case-level categorization by fiscal year,330 the completion date of the 
first merits decision was used. A total of 2,559,892 cases (dating back to 
1997) were deleted, leaving 369,600 cases. 
Detention Status. Although almost one-third of detained cases 
received televideo hearings, individuals not subject to detention (because 
they were either released or never detained in the first place) almost always 
had their cases heard in person.331 Therefore, only detained cases provided 
sufficient data to reliably test the effect of televideo adjudication. As a 
result, the data were limited to only those cases in which the respondent 
remained detained throughout the entire case.332 A total of 172,640 
nondetained cases were deleted, leaving 196,960 detained cases. 
Institutional Hearing Program. Next, cases adjudicated under the 
Institutional Hearing Program (IHP) were eliminated.333 IHP cases are not 
adjudicated while the respondent is held in civil immigration custody, but 
rather while the respondent is serving a criminal sentence of incarceration 
in a federal, state, or county facility.334 In addition to the functional 
difference in the IHP removal program and the normal civil removal 
process, the IHP’s nearly perfect removal rate impedes meaningful analysis 
 
328 Most EOIR statistical reports analyze immigration decisions only at the “proceeding” level. 
Because a single case may contain multiple proceedings, analysis at the proceeding level is not ideal for 
this Article, which seeks to understand what happens to individuals in the immigration system. As a 
result, this Article adopts a case-level approach. A similar case-level approach for analyzing 
immigration adjudication was adopted by the Vera Institute of Justice in reviewing the Legal 
Orientation Program. See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 140, at 81 (distinguishing between 
proceeding-level and case-level analysis and concluding “it would be confusing to report on 
proceedings as opposed to what we defined as ‘cases’”). 
329 See supra Figure 1 (tracking the rise in televideo hearings from 1991 to 2012). 
330 The federal government’s fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30 of the 
following year. 
331 See supra Figures 1 & 2 and accompanying text. 
332 The EOIR data classifies each case with one of three case-level codes for custody status. A 
detained respondent is coded as “D.” Respondents who are initially detained but later released—on 
bond or some alternative type of condition—are coded as “R.” If EOIR has no record of the respondent 
having been detained, the code “N” is used. 
333 For a definition of the Institutional Hearing Program (IHP), see supra note 137.  
334 See 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at P1 (describing the IHP as “a cooperative effort between 
EOIR; DHS; and various federal, state, and municipal corrections agencies”); see also VIDEO 
INITIATIVE, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining that the goal of program is to “ensure that criminal aliens are 
removed promptly from the United States after they complete their sentences”). 
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of adjudicative medium.335 A total of 8094 IHP cases were deleted,336 
leaving 188,866 cases. 
Stipulated Removals and In Absentia Removals. Two types of 
immigration court decisions were excluded on the ground that they do not 
result from the adversarial court process: stipulated removal orders and in 
absentia removal orders. Stipulated removal orders are based on a written 
agreement between the immigrant and the Department of Homeland 
Security rather than the judge’s independent analysis of the underlying 
facts.337 Therefore, by definition, stipulated orders do not test the effect of 
medium on decisionmaking.338 A total of 21,924 stipulated removal cases 
were deleted,339 leaving 166,942 cases. 
In absentia removal orders follow from the respondent’s failure to 
appear at the removal hearing, combined with the government’s 
presentation of clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the 
respondent is removable.340 Because in absentia orders are issued without 
any appearance of the respondent by video or in person, they do not 
measure the effect of adjudicative medium. Although understandably 
uncommon in the context of detention, a few of the removal cases in the 
 
335 Nearly 98% of the 8094 IHP cases removed from the data sample resulted in removal. See 
generally Interview #8, supra note 117 (explaining that IHP respondents are “almost never represented” 
and do not obtain relief). 
336 This methodological decision to remove IHP cases from the analysis of removal proceedings is 
consistent with that adopted by the Vera Institute in studying detained immigration adjudication. See 
VERA EVALUATION, supra note 140, at 78, 90. 
337 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2012). The applicable regulations provide that “[i]f the alien is 
unrepresented, the Immigration Judge must determine that the alien’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (2015). Therefore, in theory a judge could hold a hearing in a 
courtroom to determine the voluntariness of the waiver. However, such a hearing would not evaluate 
the merits of removal, only the legitimacy of the waiver. See generally Memorandum from Brian M. 
O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Procedures for Handling Requests for a Stipulated Removal Order 4 (Sept. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm10/10-01.pdf [http://perma.cc/DFB8-GNQN]. 
338 Interviewees participating in the study also confirmed that stipulated removal cases are decided 
on the paperwork, without requiring a hearing. See, e.g., Telephone Interview #6 with Dir., Field Legal 
Operations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Aug. 1, 2013) (on file with author) (explaining 
that stipulated removals are “done on the paperwork” and do not involve court hearings).  
339 A similar methodological decision to eliminate stipulated removals from analysis was made by 
the Vera Institute for Justice, in consultation with EOIR officials, in studying the Legal Orientation 
Program (LOP). See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 140, at 90 (removing stipulated removals for 
purposes of analyzing case outcomes).  
340 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(a) (“In any exclusion proceeding before an Immigration Judge in which the 
applicant fails to appear, the Immigration Judge shall conduct an in absentia hearing . . . .”). See 
generally Susan Bibler Coutin, In the Breach: Citizenship and Its Approximations, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 109, 134 (2013) (“When individuals who are in removal proceedings fail to appear in 
court, perhaps out of fear or perhaps due to not receiving a notice to appear in the mail, they can be 
ordered removed in absentia.”). 
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sample did result in in absentia orders.341 A total of 765 in absentia removal 
cases were deleted,342 leaving 166,177 cases. 
Juvenile Cases. The EOIR data included cases of both children and 
adults. Research has shown that the juvenile cases have a high success 
rate,343 especially given the availability of juvenile-specific relief such as 
special immigrant juvenile status.344 Therefore, in order to restrict the 
analysis to adult cases as much as possible, those proceedings coded as 
juvenile cases by EOIR were removed.345 A total of 2070 juvenile cases 
were deleted,346 leaving 164,107 cases. 
In-Person and Televideo Adjudications. For purposes of classifying 
adjudicative mode at the case level, the medium used throughout the merits 
proceeding was assigned.347 Hybrid cases, which involved both in-person 
and televideo hearings within a single merits proceeding, were excluded.348 
Hybrid merits proceedings, which occurred in approximately 6% of the 
remaining cases, could not be classified as either televideo or in person in 
the analysis.349 A total of 10,272 hybrid cases were deleted,350 leaving 
153,835 cases. 
 
341 EOIR attributes this small number of detained cases that result in removal orders in absentia to 
“illness or transportation problems.” 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at H2. Further research is needed 
to determine why a court would order a detained immigrant who is ill or suffering a transportation 
problem removed in absentia.  
342 Other studies examining outcomes in immigration proceedings have similarly removed in 
absentia orders. See GAO REPORT, supra note 128, at 23 n.32. 
343 See Lenni B. Benson & Claire R. Thomas, Letter to the Editor, Lawyers for Immigrant Youths, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/opinion/lawyers-for-immigrant-
youths.html [http://perma.cc/MW48-5Y46] (citing research by the Safe Passage Project finding that 
90% of unaccompanied minors surveyed qualified for immigration relief).  
344 See generally Kristen Jackson, Special Status Seekers, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2012, at 20, 20. 
345 Other researchers have made similar methodological decisions. See VERA EVALUATION, supra 
note 140, at 79. In selecting juvenile cases, the methodology adopted by the Vera Institute, in 
consultation with EOIR, was followed. Id. (classifying juvenile cases as those with a case identification 
variable of J, J1, UJ, ND, and U as variables indicating either juvenile, unaccompanied juvenile, or 
NACARA dependent); see also Adjournment Code Memo, supra note 110 (defining EOIR’s case 
identification codes). 
346 Although there has been an increase in the number of children in removal proceedings, many 
are released from detention prior to the conclusion of their case and therefore not included in the 
detained removal dataset. For a timely analysis of children in immigration courts, see New Data on 
Unaccompanied Children in Immigration Court, TRAC IMMIGR. (July 15, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/359/ [http://perma.cc/YN57-VHZ4]. 
347 Thus, the adjudicative medium of administrative closures and transfers, remand proceedings, 
and reopenings of merits decisions were not considered. 
348 As presented in Part I.B and Figure 4, supra, once an adjudicative mode is adopted, it is 
typically the mode used for all hearings in the proceeding.  
349 In analyzing the data, there was no consistent pattern in how medium was used within hybrid 
proceedings. Approximately 42% of hybrid cases began with their first hearing in person, while the 
others began in televideo. Some hybrid proceedings held more than half of hearings in person, while 
others held the majority by televideo. Of those hybrid proceedings that had merits hearings, some used 
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The final National Sample included 153,835 detained removal cases, 
representing fifty-two different base cities and 266 different judges. Among 
these detained cases, approximately one-fourth were adjudicated by 
televideo and three-fourths were adjudicated in person. 
B. Active Base City Sample 
The following additional steps modified the National Sample just 
described to create an Active Base City Sample: 
Multiple-Judge Cases. Standard practice in the immigration courts is 
that one judge handles the entire removal proceeding from start to finish.351 
However, close analysis of the data reveals that occasionally more than one 
judge adjudicated an immigration case, such as to accommodate leaves of 
absence or judicial reassignments. A total of 7680 cases adjudicated by 
more than one judge were removed,352 leaving 146,155 cases. 
Visiting Judges. Sometimes immigration judges are assigned to hear 
cases outside their regularly assigned base city court, a practice often 
referred to as “detailing” judges to other jurisdictions. This judicial 
detailing practice is important to identify, as studies have found that judges 
deciding cases outside their normal assigned court may adjudicate cases 
differently, reflecting responsiveness to local court norms.353 A total of 
2741 cases adjudicated by judges on detail were removed,354 leaving 
143,414 cases. 
Active Base Cities. To provide for more robust comparison across 
adjudicative medium, base cities that that did not decide at least 1000 
 
televideo, others used in person, and some used both mediums. For further discussion of the varied 
scenarios in which hybrid proceedings occur, see supra notes 111–18 and accompanying text. 
350 This total includes 627 cases for which there were no data on adjudicative medium. 
351 See, e.g., Telephone Interview #48, supra note 1 (“If the venue changes then you change judge.  
But if the case starts with me, no, it doesn’t go to the courtroom next door for any reason.”). 
352 For purposes of identifying those cases adjudicated by more than one immigration judge, coding 
of the hearing-level judge was analyzed. Hearings where EOIR’s adjournment coding clearly indicated 
that the hearing was not held (including unplanned immigration judge leave or detail assignment, 
resetting of the hearing, and data entry errors) were not included in this analysis. 
353 See James L. Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of Judges: A 
Representational Model of Judicial Decision Making, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343, 358 (1980) (finding 
substantial variation in sentencing decisions of lower court criminal judges hearing cases outside their 
normal court). 
354 For purposes of deciding when judges were outside their regularly assigned jurisdiction, judges 
were assigned to the base city in which the majority of their decisions were rendered in the relevant 
time period. This methodological decision to remove cases adjudicated by judges outside their normal 
base city court is consistent with other studies. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 128, at 103 
(analyzing case outcomes only with respect to judges’ “primary immigration court; that is, the 
immigration court in which they heard the majority of their cases”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 
149, at 396 & n.186 (noting that the authors “excluded decisions by immigration judges detailed to the 
court in question”). 
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televideo and 1000 in-person cases during fiscal years 2011 and 2012 were 
eliminated. Applying this minimum case requirement, 83,889 cases were 
removed.355 
The final Active Base City Sample included 59,525 removal cases, 
representing eight different base cities356 and sixty-six different 
immigration judges. Among these cases, 42% were adjudicated by 
televideo, and 58% in person. 
C. Regression Analysis of Active Base City Sample 
To gain an understanding of additional factors that might affect case 
outcomes, I reviewed the existing literature and attended immigration 
removal proceedings in five of the largest immigration court 
jurisdictions.357 Next, working with the Active Base City Sample described 
in Section B of the Appendix, I coded the following respondent and case 
characteristics: 
Counsel. Previous studies using EOIR data found representation by 
counsel to be an important predictor of granting relief in immigration 
proceedings.358 Accordingly, each case was coded based on whether the 
respondent was represented by counsel during the relevant merits 
proceeding.359 This study counts immigrants as represented by counsel if a 
Notice of Entry of Appearance form (known as an EOIR-28) was filed with 
the court prior to the completion of the merits proceeding.360 In addition, if 
an EOIR-28 form was filed after the completion of the merits proceeding, 
 
355 Other scholars conducting research on EOIR data have similarly taken the methodological step 
of limiting their review to those jurisdictions that decided the largest numbers of the type of case under 
review. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 149, at 395 (studying outcomes in seventeen “high-volume 
immigration courts”). 
356 The cities are: Adelanto, California; Dallas, Texas; El Paso, Texas; Houston, Texas; Los 
Angeles, California; Oakdale, Louisiana; San Antonio, Texas; and York, Pennsylvania. 
357 See supra note 32. 
358 See, e.g., Anker, supra note 178, at 454 (reporting in a study of 149 asylum hearings, every 
successful claimant was represented by “experienced counsel”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 149, 
at 376 (“We confirmed the findings of prior studies showing that represented clients win their cases at a 
rate that is about three times higher than the rate for unrepresented clients.”); Peter L. Markowitz et al., 
Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The 
Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363–64, 
383–85 (2011) (finding, based on data from New York immigration courts, that detained and 
nondetained respondents are more likely to obtain relief from removal when represented by counsel). 
359 It is important to acknowledge that representation by counsel in immigration court includes a 
small number of nonattorneys working for nonprofit or charitable organizations that are certified to 
appear in court as “accredited representatives.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1292.1(a)(4), 1292.2 (2015).  
360 EOIR similarly relies on the filing of the EOIR-28 to identify proceedings with representation 
by counsel, but does not consider whether the attorney joined the case prior to the judge’s decision on 
the merits. 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at G1.  
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the respondent was counted as represented by counsel if an attorney 
appeared in at least one hearing within the relevant merits proceeding.361 
Nationality. Previous studies have found that immigrants from certain 
countries or geographic regions have a higher likelihood of receiving relief 
from removal.362 Therefore, I coded each case based on nationality of the 
respondent and assigned each case to one of six geographic regions: 
Mexico, Central America, South America, Caribbean, Asia, and Other.363 
Prosecutorial Charge Type. Every removal case begins with the filing 
of a charging document that states the government’s legal basis for 
removal.364 For purposes of analysis, I assigned the charge filed in each 
case to one of four categories365: (1) aggravated felony;366 (2) other criminal 
conduct;367 (3) reentry and entry without inspection;368 and (4) other civil 
 
361 In the Active Base City Sample (n = 59,525), only 138 individuals had an EOIR-28 form filed 
after the conclusion of the merits proceeding, twenty-seven of whom had an attorney present in at least 
one hearing and therefore were counted as represented. The Vera Institute for Justice, in consultation 
with EOIR, similarly excluded individuals with late-filed EOIR-28 forms from its categorization of 
represented cases, but did not engage in the hearing-level analysis to confirm whether such respondents 
were in fact unrepresented in court. See VERA EVALUATION, supra note 140, at 59 n.76, 83–84.  
362 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 128, at 80–82 & tbl.10 (finding sizable differences in 
asylum grant rates based on applicant nationality, for both affirmative and defensive claims); Asylum 
Denial Rates by Nationality Before and After the Attorney General’s Directive, TRAC (2009), http:// 
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/209/include/nationality_denial.html [http://perma.cc/X8CS-2EMD] 
(revealing variation in asylum grant rates based on the nationality of the applicant). 
363 Philip Schrag and his co-authors utilized a similar technique of relying on world regions to 
analyze EOIR data. See Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s 
Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 651, 780, 792 (2010). 
Following their approach, I adopted the World Bank methodology to assign countries to six world 
regions. See Countries, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country [http://perma.cc/36SX-
ER5L]. Because over 96% of removal respondents in the Active Base Cities were from the World 
Bank’s region of Latin America and the Caribbean, I divided this region into: Mexico (n = 41,788), 
Central America (n = 13,618), South America (n = 860), and Caribbean (n = 1034). Due to the limited 
number of respondents in the other World Bank regions, I combined them into two categories: Asia (n = 
888, which includes World Bank’s categories of East Asia and Pacific, Central Asia, and South Asia); 
and Other (n = 1322, which includes the World Bank’s categories of Europe, Africa, and Middle East 
and North Africa). 
364 See generally VERA EVALUATION, supra note 140, at 84 (“Charges on the notice to appear 
issued by ICE and recorded in the EOIR data are attached to each proceeding . . . .”). In the Active Base 
City Sample used for the regression analysis, prosecutors used seventy-two unique charges. 
365 This categorization of prosecutorial charges builds on a similar classification approach 
developed by TRAC. See Charges Asserted in Deportation Proceedings in the Immigration Courts: FY 
2002—FY 2011, TRAC (2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/260/include/detailchg.html [http: 
//perma.cc/JTG2-VF3Z]. 
366 The aggravated felony category includes all charges based on convictions classified as 
aggravated felonies under the federal immigration law. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). In 
addition, a total of thirteen cases that included more severe terrorism or national security charges were 
included under the aggravated felony category. 
367 All criminal conduct and convictions not included in the “aggravated felony” category are 
included in the “other criminal conduct” category. 
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immigration charge.369 Respondents with multiple charges were assigned to 
the category considered most serious under federal immigration 
enforcement priorities (aggravated felony being the most serious, and other 
civil immigration charge the least serious).370 
Fiscal Year. In recent years, the percentage of individuals in removal 
who are actually ordered removed has declined.371 At the same time, the use 
of televideo has increased over time.372 Therefore, to control for fiscal year, 
the data were coded based on whether the case was decided in 2011 or 
2012.373 
Judge. Previous studies have found that the assignment of judge is an 
important predictor of immigration case outcomes.374 To account for any 
unmeasured factors peculiar to judge assignment that might influence case 
outcomes, the analysis included a fixed effects regression based on the 
assignment of judge.375 By estimating the judge’s influence over his or her 
cases, the fixed effects regression helps to eliminate any potential source of 
 
368 The reentry and entry without inspection category includes all individuals charged as illegally 
entering under the federal immigration law, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), or returning to the 
United States after a prior deportation, see, e.g., id. § 1182(a)(9)(A).  
369 All civil immigration charges not classified as “reentry and entry without inspection” are 
included under the “other civil immigration charge” category. Common charges in this category are 
presence in violation of the immigration law and lack of a valid immigration visa. See id. §§ 1182(a)(7), 
1227(a)(1)(B). 
370 This methodology of prioritizing the most serious charge for categorizing removal statistics 
follows the prioritization hierarchy adopted by the United States Department of Homeland Security. 
Memo from John Morton, supra note 187 (categorizing noncitizens who pose a danger to national 
security or a risk to public safety, especially those convicted of crimes, repeat immigration violators, 
and recent border crossers as the first priority for removal); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals 1, 5 (2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immigration-removals.pdf [http://perma.cc/28YE-L884] (noting 
that “[f]or purposes of prioritizing the removal of aliens convicted of crimes,” ICE relies on the level of 
severity of the criminal conviction, with the most serious “Level 1 offenders [being] those aliens 
convicted of ‘aggravated felonies’”). For an insightful analysis of the shortcomings of the federal 
government’s central role in establishing priorities as to who should be deported, see Elina Treyger, The 
Deportation Conundrum, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 107 (2014). 
371 2012 YEARBOOK, supra note 23, at D2 fig.5. 
372 See supra Figures 1–3. 
373 The completion date (“comp_date”) of the first merits proceeding was used to categorize fiscal 
year of the case. See supra note 330 (defining fiscal year). 
374 See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 128, at 103–18 (concluding that “when immigration judges 
across all immigration courts were considered, pronounced differences existed across immigration 
judges in terms of the percentage of affirmative cases they granted”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 
149, at 303 (finding “very significant differences from one decision maker to the next in the 
adjudication of asylum cases”); Immigration Judges, TRAC (July 31, 2006), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/160 [http://perma.cc/KE39-3ZZW] (“An extensive analysis of how hundreds of 
thousands of requests for asylum in the United States have been handled has documented a great 
disparity in the rate at which individual immigration judges declined the applications.”). 
375 It is worth noting that utilizing an alternative multilevel model that applied random effects 
instead of fixed effects to observations grouped by judge yielded almost identical results to those 
described in this Article. 
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bias not captured by other predictors in the statistical model. As is standard 
practice, applying the fixed effects regression requires removing those 
cases where no meaningful statistical estimate can be drawn because all 
outcomes are the same. Therefore, instances where all of a particular 
judge’s cases in the sample reached the identical outcome for a particular 
stage were deleted.376 The number of cases dropped on this basis is 
reflected in the footnotes to Table 1. 
Missing Data. Fifteen cases were missing data for one of the 
predictors (region) and were thus deleted, leaving 59,510 cases. 
Final Sample. The final Active Base City Sample used for the 
regression analysis included 59,510 detained removal cases, representing 
eight different base cities and sixty-six different judges. Among these 
cases, 42% were adjudicated by televideo, and 58% in person. Among the 
sixty-six different judges included in this sample, 61% heard both televideo 
and in-person cases. 
 
 * * * 
 
In order to statistically analyze the impact of adjudicative medium in 
the detained removal process, I used a sequential logit regression model377 
to control for the respondent- and case-level attributes just described. Table 
1 displays the results of the sequential logit regression analysis of the 
Active Base City Sample that estimates the influence of videoconferencing 
across six different outcomes in detained removal cases. The first column, 
titled “Counsel,” pertains to whether respondents obtained counsel. The 
second column, titled “Stage 1 Outcome,” pertains to whether respondents 
had their case terminated. The third column, titled “Stage 2 Applications,” 
pertains to whether respondents (whose cases were not terminated) 
accepted removal or instead applied for relief or voluntary departure. 
Finally, the fourth column, titled “Stage 2 Application Outcome,” pertains 
to whether respondents (1) who applied for relief were granted relief 
(versus removal or voluntary departure) or (2) who only applied for 
voluntary departure were granted voluntary departure (versus removal). 
The first row of data, titled “In Person,” shows the odds of a 
respondent who obtained each of the outcome measures just described if 
adjudicated in person, as compared to the odds of a similarly situated 
 
376 The GAO applied a similar methodology in conducting a logistic regression on immigration 
judge decisions in asylum cases, excluding those “immigration judges who had all grants or all denials.” 
GAO REPORT, supra note 128, at 122. 
377 For an additional description of this analysis, see supra Figure 5. See also supra Part II.B.  
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respondent adjudicated by televideo—described statistically as an adjusted 
odds ratio.378 The odds ratios displayed in Table 1 show that, even after 
controlling for all of the various factors discussed in this Appendix, sizable 
differences in outcomes remained between in-person and televideo 
adjudication. Specifically, the first row of regression results shows that the 
odds of an in-person respondent (as compared to those of a comparable 
televideo respondent) were 46% higher for obtaining counsel (p < 0.001); 
170% higher for applying for relief (p < 0.001); 12% higher for applying 
for voluntary departure only (without other forms of relief) (p < 0.001); and 
27% higher for obtaining termination (p < 0.05). However, despite odds 
ratios of 1.21 (for relief) and 1.09 (for voluntary departure), there was no 
statistically significant difference in the grant rate among those respondents 
who applied for relief from removal (see “Grant Relief Application” 
column) or the grant rate among respondents who only applied for 
voluntary departure (see “Grant VD Only Application” column). These 
findings suggest that, although medium may not be statistically linked to 
grant rates on relief or voluntary departure applications, it does have a 
statistically significant relationship to other procedural outcomes, even 




378 In other words, the adjusted odds ratio includes statistical controls to allow for simultaneous 
consideration of the effects of the different case and respondent characteristics included in Table 1. See 
generally GAO REPORT, supra note 128, at 94 (defining “adjusted odds ratios” as relying on 
“multivariate logistic regression models which involve an iterative statistical estimation procedure to 
obtain a net effect estimate for each factor” that could affect outcomes). 
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D. Regression Analysis of National Sample 
A sequential logit regression analysis was also run on the National 
Sample of 153,835 detained removal cases introduced in Section A of the 
Appendix. First, following the methodology described in Section C, the 
following respondent and case characteristics were coded: counsel, 
nationality, prosecutorial charge type, fiscal year of decision, and judge 
assigned to the case. Second, a number of steps were taken to improve the 
model’s predictions across groups of cases decided by the same judge:379 
Multiple-Judge Cases. A total of 7680 cases adjudicated by more than 
one judge were removed, leaving 146,155 cases. 
Visiting Judges. A total of 2741 cases adjudicated by judges on detail 
were removed, leaving 143,414 cases. 
Active Judges. To provide for more robust comparison across 
adjudicative medium, judges that decided fewer than twenty-five detained 
removal cases over the two-year period of study (2011–2012) were 
removed. Applying this minimum case requirement, 540 cases were 
removed, leaving 142,874 cases. 
Missing Data. Cases that were missing data for one of the predictors 
(region) were deleted (117 total), leaving 142,757 cases. 
Fixed Effects Regression for Judge. As in the Active Base City 
Sample, a fixed effect regression was assigned at the judge level. The 
number of cases dropped at each stage on this basis is reflected in the 
footnotes to Table 2. 
Final Sample. The final National Sample used for the regression 
analysis included 142,757 detained removal cases, representing forty 
different base cities and 167 different judges. Among these cases, 26% 
were adjudicated by televideo, and 74% in person. Among the 167 different 
judges included in this sample, 55% heard cases in both televideo and in 
person.  
 
379 For a detailed description of these variables, see supra Appendix, Section C. 
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